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CONTEXTUALIZING THE TENSIONS AND
WEAKNESSES OF INFORMATION PRIVACY AND
DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS
Mark Burdont
Abstract
Data breach notification laws have detailed numerousfailures
relating to the protection of personal information that have blighted
both corporate and governmental institutions. There are obvious
parallels between data breach notification and information privacy
law as they both involve the protection of personal information.
However, a closer examination of both laws reveals conceptual
diferences that give rise to vertical tensions between each law and
shared horizontal weaknesses within both laws. Tensions emanate
from conflicting approaches to the implementation of information
privacy law that results in different regimes and the implementation
of different types of protections. Shared weaknesses arise from an
overtfocus on specified types ofpersonal information which results in
'one size fits all' legal remedies. The author contends that a greater
contextual approach which promotes the importance of social context
is requiredand highlights the effect that contextualization could have
on both laws.
I. INTRODUCTION

Data breach notification laws appear to have been a successful
addition to legal frameworks relating to the protection of personal
information. For example, as a result of these laws, numerous
information security failings have been reported that have affected
both corporate and governmental institutions.' They have uncovered a
major social problem that has the capacity to affect millions of
t PhD Candidate/Research Associate, Faculty of Law/Information Security Institute,
Queensland University of Technology. The author gratefully acknowledges funding from
Australian Research Council Grant DPO879015 'A new legal framework for identifying and
reporting Australian data breaches.'
PDF Reports,
Periodic
Foundation,
Open
Security
e.g.,
1. See,
http://datalossdb.org/reports tlast visited Sept. 10, 2010) (detailing the numerous data breaches
that have been notified since the inception of US state-based notification laws).
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citizens.2 They have highlighted that general levels of corporate
information security practices are inadequate. It is not surprising that
these apparent successes have been instrumental in the proliferation
of data breach notification laws throughout the United States (US)
and beyond. Only a handful of US state legislatures have not yet
enacted a data breach notification law' and it is possible that a federal
law will be implemented this year.4 Other jurisdictions have also
followed suit, including the European Union (EU),5 and
comprehensive proposals have been put forward in a number of other
jurisdictions including Australia, 6 Canada, New Zealand and the

2. See, e.g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Chronology of Data Breaches,
http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach#2 (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (suggesting that
hundreds of millions of US citizens may have been affected by a data breach).
3. Currently, only four states do not have a data breach notification law: Alabama,
Kentucky, New Mexico and South Dakota. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State
Security
Breach
Notification
Laws,
Apr.
12,
2010,
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Telecommunications
InformationTechnology/SecurityBreachNotificationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx (last visited
October 6, 2010).
4. The Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2009, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009) is the
first bill to have passed a vote from one of the Houses of Congress. See David Navetta, House
Passes DataAccountability and Trust Act (DATA), INFORMATION LAW GROUP, Dec. 10, 2009,
http://www.infolawgroup.com/2009/12/articles/data-privacy-law-or-regulation/house-passesdata-accountability-and-trust-act-data/. It should also be noted that the Personal Data Privacy
and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong. (2009) has also been referred from the Senate
Judiciary Committee to a full vote on the Senate floor. See Jaikumar Vijayan, FederalDataprotection
Law
Inches
Forward,
COMPUTERWORLD,
Nov.
5,
2009,
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9140408/Federal-dataprotection-law-inches-forwar
d.
5. See Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive
2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications
networks and services Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 (EC), Council
Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC) concerning the processing of personal data and
the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of
consumer protection laws (2009) [hereinafter e-Privacy Directive]. See also Mark Burdon, et al.,
The Mandatory Notification of Data Breaches: Issues Arising for Australian and EU Legal
Developments, 26 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 115, 120-23 (2010) (regarding an overview
of the notification provisions of the new Directive) [hereinafter Burdon et al., Mandatory
Notification ofData Breaches].
6. See AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE (2008) [hereinafter AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW
AND PRACTICE] (regarding the Australian Law Reform Commission's proposal for an Australian
data breach notification scheme).
7. See Stikeman Elliot, Bill C-29 proposes to enhance current private-sectorprivacy
legislation,
Aug.
13,
2010,
http://www.canadiantechnologyiplaw.com/2010/08/articles/privacy/bill-c29-proposes-toenhance-current-privatesector-privacy-legislation/ (regarding a recent bill put before the
Canadian House of Commons to implement a data breach notification scheme via the Personal
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United Kingdom (UK).9
At face value, there are apparent similarities between data breach
notification laws and information privacy laws as they both involve
legal obligations relating to the protection of personal information.o
Both laws seek to foster better security practices and have an
information dissemination role that provides an individual with
greater knowledge about how his or her information is stored and
used. However, the development of data breach notification laws
relates to a fundamental difference within information privacy legal
regimes that is typically highlighted by distinctions between the
sectoral approach to information privacy adopted by the US and the
comprehensive approach to data protection adopted by the EU and
other countries." These distinctions manifest in different ways and
this article identifies vertical tensions between both laws and shared
horizontal weaknesses within both laws.
Data breach notification laws were developed in the absence of a
comprehensive data protection framework as a specific law for a
particular problem,12 whereas they are now being implemented within
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2000 (Can)). See also Industry Canada,
Government of Canada Moves to Enhance Safety and Security in the Online Marketplace,
MARKETWIRE, May 25, 2010, http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Government-ofCanada-Moves-to-Enhance-Safety-and-Security-in-the-Online-Marketplace- 1265966.htm
(regarding an overview of the proposed amendments); CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY AND
PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC, APPROACHES TO SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION: A WHITE PAPER,

36 (2007) (regarding a review of data breach notification in Canada).
8. See LAW COMMISSION OF NEW ZEALAND, REVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT 1993:
ISSUES PAPER 17 (2010) (regarding a recent review of the New Zealand Privacy Act and the
possible introduction of a data breach notification scheme).
9. The United Kingdom has taken a different track to data breach notification compared
to other countries. A formal data breach notification scheme has been rejected by the
Information Commissioner as notification of problems to the Commissioner was deemed to be a
matter of existing good practice. See The News, The UK Does Not Need a Data Breach
Notification Law, Says Government, OUT-LAw NEWS, Nov. 25, 2008, http://www.outlaw.com/page-9619. However, the Commissioner has been granted extra powers to award
penalties of £STG500,000 against organizations in breach of the Data Protection Act 1998
(UK), which includes data breaches. See Dan Raywood, Half a Million Pound Penalty
Introducedfor Personal Data Security Breaches by the Information Commissioner's Office, SC
MAGAZINE, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.scmagazineuk.com/half-a-million-pound-penaltyintroduced-for-personal-data-security-breaches-by-the-information-commissionersoffice/article/161159/ (providing an overview of the introduction of the fine).
10. See, e.g., Priscilla M. Regan, Federal Security Breach Notifications: Politics and
Approaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1103, 1106 (2009) (regarding data breach notification as
a concern of sectoral information privacy law in the US).
It should be noted that the concepts of information privacy and data protection are
11.
used interchangeably in this article although the author acknowledges differences between them.
12. See Jill Joerling, DataBreach Notification Laws: An Argument for a Comprehensive
FederalLaw to Protect Consumer Data, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 467, 471 (2010) (explaining
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the generic rights-based frameworks founded on comprehensive
approaches to data protection or information privacy.' 3 Data breach
notification laws consequently not only attempt to fulfill a specific
purpose, the mitigation of identity theft, but also have expansive
conceptual aims originating from the conflicting goals of consumer
compliance
cost minimization.
and
corporate
protection
Comprehensive information privacy legal frameworks, on the other
hand, have an expansive purpose, namely, to ensure legal protections
related to the protection of personal information. Information privacy
laws set minimum standards that relate to fair information practices
and provide individuals with a series of limited rights of involvement
in the process of personal information exchange.1 4 The different
developmental rationales behind encryption safe harbors for data
breach notification demonstrate differences in the types of regulatory
responses adopted by both laws. Data breach notification laws adopt
market-based initiatives that are cognizant of corporate compliance
cost burdens, whereas comprehensive information privacy laws adopt
rights-based protections that favor individual interests over corporate
requirements. 15
Combined with vertical tensions, there are also shared horizontal
weaknesses because both laws are predicated on overt informationbased foundations.16 Both laws focus too much on the type of
information regulated rather than the social contexts and relationships
that are involved in the personal information generation and exchange
processes. Regulatory responses are formed upon the creation of
chains of accountability and "one size fits all" remedies. These chains
are founded upon binary relationships involving three parties: a
personal information provider, a personal information collector, and a
personal information re-user. 1 Problems occur in the application of

California enacted the country's first data breach notification law on July 1, 2003).
13. Id. at 473 (explaining that other states use similar frameworks but alter them). See
generally Burdon et al., supra note 5 (regarding the implementation of data breach notification
in the comprehensive frameworks of the EU and Australia).
14. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Why Privacy, http://www.privacy rights.org/whyprivacy (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
15. See, e.g., Sara A. Needles, The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based
Approach to Data Breach Notification Law, 88 N.C. L. REv. 267, 280-281 (2009) (regarding the
distinction between data protection and data security perspectives and different emphases at the
heart of data breach notification laws).
16. See discussion at Part I.C.
17. Mark Burdon, Privacy Invasive Geo-Mashups: Privacy 2.0 and the Limits of First
Generation Information Privacy Laws, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 101, 32 (2010)
[hereinafter Burdon, First GenerationLaws].
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both laws because the social process of information exchange can
now involve more parties than envisaged by one-dimensional and
largely static chains of accountability. Data breaches themselves
provide illumination on this point as they typically involve the
insertion of a third party auxiliary to the accountability framework
created by both laws, as demonstrated by an overview of three
illustrative data breaches.
Part II of this article provides a brief overview of the conceptual
foundations and development of both information privacy and data
breach notification law. Part III examines the conflicting vertical
tensions and Part IV identifies the shared horizontal weaknesses of
both laws. The purpose of this examination is to demonstrate
underlying conceptual weaknesses of data breach notification and
information privacy laws that are founded on an insufficient regard
for the crucial role of social context and social relationships as the
foundation of information exchange processes. Part V introduces
notions of contextualization that promote legal attention towards
social relationships rather than specific types of information, which in
turn, suggest a different approach to the conceptualization and
application of both laws.
II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS & LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT

Later sections of this article will examine the conflicting tensions
and shared weaknesses of both laws. Before that analysis can take
place, however, it is necessary to briefly overview the conceptual
foundations and legislative development of information privacy and
data breach notification laws.
A. Information Privacy Law
The legal concept of information privacy is generally considered
a sub-set of the many and multi-faceted theories of privacy that has
been generated through the kaleidoscopic lens of different authors and
different academic disciplines.18 Attempts to answer the question
"What is privacy?" in a meaningfully legal sense have generated
literature that is immense in its intellectual breadth, intense in its
scholarly conviction, and ingenious in its development of analytical

18. See Philip Leith, The Socio-Legal Context of Privacy, 2 INT'L. J.L. CONTEXT 105,
108 (2006) (regarding the socio-legal implications of privacy and the limits of information
privacy); Herman T. Tavani, PhilosophicalTheories of Privacy: Implicationsfor an Adequate
Online Privacy Policy, 38 METAPHILOSOPHY 1, 2, 3-9 (2007) (reviewing the basis of different
theories of privacy).
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frameworks. An answer to the question sought has not been
forthcoming, thus leading to a degree of despair about whether such
an answer can ever be found.19 Conversely, attempts to answer the
question "What is information privacy?" are much more coherent
from a conceptual sense to the extent that information privacy laws
have been implemented in many different legal jurisdictions.20
The concept of information privacy is generally associated with
control theories of privacy that relate to an individual's choice
regarding the disclosure of his or her personal information. 2' One
of the first and most influential representations of the control
theory is Westin's "Privacy and Freedom." 22 Westin did not use
either the term "right" or "control" or even "information privacy"
in his description of an individual's required claim for information
privacy, 23 but his work has nonetheless been perceived as
addressing information privacy that provides individual rights of
control over personal information. 24 In Privacy and Freedom,
19. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1-2 (Harvard
University Press. 2008) [hereinafter SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY] (providing an
overview of commentaries). See also William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American
Law, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 253, 255 (1966) (doubting whether it is possible to define a
"right to privacy"); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001)
(commenting that the notion of privacy is so complex that it cannot be usefully conceptualized
because it is so entangled with competing and contradictory dimensions); Judith Jarvis
Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 310 (1975) (contending that ideas
about the right of privacy are so overlapped by other rights that it is indeterminable).
20. COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE, 8 (MIT Press 2nd and updated ed. 2006) [hereinafter
BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY] (regarding the policy goals of different
jurisdictions "to give individuals greater control of the information that is collected, stored,
processed, and disseminated about them" by organizations).
21. See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY INEUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 14 (1992) (regarding the analogous links between
"data protection" and Westin's information privacy); Tavani, supra note 18, at 7 (regarding an
overview of key authors and theoretical applications); See, e.g., Lisa Austin, Privacy and the
Question of Technology, 22 L. & PHIL. 119, 125 (2003) (stating that individual control of
personal information has been a key tenet of information privacy laws and has been a significant
driver of conceptual development).
22. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (Atheneum 1970) (1967).
23. But see id. at 42 (regarding Westin's "right of individual privacy" which is defined as
"the right of the individual to decide for himself, with only extraordinary exceptions in the
interests of society, when and on what terms his acts should be revealed to the general public").
24. See, e.g., JAMES B. RULE, PRIVACY INPERIL 22-23 (2007) (regarding the influence of
Westin's work and the need to regulate organizational data systems in the late 1960s and early
1970s); RAYMOND WACKS, PERSONAL INFORMATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 14 (1993)
(noting the influence of Privacy and Freedom in relation to privacy as control definitions of
privacy); JAMES WALDO ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., ENGAGING
PRIVACY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN A DIGITAL AGE 59-60 (2007) (highlighting
Westin's role in the development of the concept of information privacy).
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Westin determined four basic states of individual privacy: solitude,
intimacy, anonymity, and reserve. 25 The latter state, reserve, is of
the most interest regarding information privacy as it requires the
creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion; this
occurs when the individual's need to limit communication about
himself is protected by the willing discretion of those surrounding
him. 26
The need for barriers is necessary as communication of the self
is always incomplete. The requirements of societal involvement mean
individuals are required to retain some information about them which
is too personal for other persons or organizations to possess. 27 This
mental distance, the space generated by choosing not to declare
everything about one's self, requires an individual to have the ability
and control to withhold or to disclose personal information. The
ability of choice over our own information is consequently the
"dynamic aspect of privacy in daily interpersonal relations." 28
Westin also adduced four specific functions of privacy that
reflect the value or purpose of privacy within society. 29 They are:
personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation, and limited
and protected communication.30 Again, the latter function is of
relevance and it has two facets. The first, limited communication, sets
interpersonal boundaries for the exchange of personal information.
The second, protected communication, "provides for sharing personal
information with trusted others." 31 It is the state of reserve in
conjunction with limited and protected communication that is inherent
in Westin's definition of information privacy: "Privacy is the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to
others." 32

Information privacy law is consequently based on the notion that
individuals have rights relating to control over their personal
information, or at least, have rights pertaining to who can access
25. WESTIN, supranote 22, at 31-32.
26. Id. at 32.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id
31. See Stephen Margulis, T., On the Status and Contribution of Westin's and Altman's
Theories ofPrivacy, 59 J. Soc. ISSUES 411, 413 (2003).
32. WESTIN, supra note 22, at 7.
33. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (stating that privacy
regards "the control we have over information about ourselves"); Arthur R Miller, Personal
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their personal information 4 or a combination of both.3 s However, the
"privacy as control paradigm" 36 is not without its critics. Schwartz
highlights that while the control model has benefits because it seeks
"to place the individual at the centre of decision-making about
personal information use," 3 7 it nonetheless suffers from several major
flaws because it pays little consideration to information
asymmetries, 38 and it is founded on the idea that personal information
can mistakenly be construed as property. 39 Regan also states that
Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented
Society, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1107 (1968) ("the basic attribute of an effective right to privacy
is the individual's ability to control the flow of information concerning or describing him");
Randall P Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News and Social Change, 18901990, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1135 (1992) (advancing a "concept of privacy based on the
individual's control of information"); JERRY KANG, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions,50 STAN. L. REv. 1193, 1203 (1998) (referring to an individual's control over the
processing of personal information); PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY:
TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 9 (University of North Carolina Press
1995) [hereinafter REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY] (commenting that privacy, in regard to US
governmental collection of personal data, was defined as the "right of individuals to exercise
some control over the use of information about themselves").
34. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits ofLaw, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980)
(contending that privacy is a concern of accessibility that includes physical access by and the
attention of other individuals); RULE, supra note 24, at 3 ("Let me define privacy as the
exercise of an authentic option to withhold information on one's self'); Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1110 (2002) (stating that information privacy
as the right to "control-over-information can be viewed as a subset of the limited access
conception"); David Archard, The Value of Privacy, in PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 16
(Erik Claes, et al. eds., 2006) (stating that the concept of limited access to a specified personal
domain is the most plausible notion of privacy).
35. See, e.g., James H. Moor, Towards a Theory of Privacy in the Information Age, 27
COMP. & Soc. 27, 31 (outlining the restricted access/limited control approach to privacy).
36. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000).
37. Id.
38. Id at 830 (regarding privacy as control as the "commodification illusion").
39. The notion of personal information as property has been a controversial aspect of the
information privacy law literature. See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 22, at 324-25 (introducing the
notion that personal information can be classed as property). See also Lawrence Lessig, Privacy
as Property, 69 Soc. RES. 261 (2002) (comparing privacy protection to intellectual property
protection and the propertization of privacy "to allow individuals to differently value their
privacy"); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in PersonalInformation: An Economic Defense
of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996) (outlining an economic theory of personal
information as property). Contra Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and
the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1390 (2000) ("Juxtaposing the data privacy
debate with the politics of intellectual property thus exposes an ideological fault line within the
transaction costs approach to designating property interests"); Corien Prins, Property and
Privacy: European Perspectives and the Commodyilcation of our Identity, in THE FUTURE OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 249 (Lucie M. C. R. Guibault & P. B. Hugenholtz eds., 2006) (regarding
the difficulties in assigning value to personal information); Sonia Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7
YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 242 (2004) (stating a weakness of the propertization of privacy concept
is that it is grounded in notions of real property which do not extend to cyberspace).
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Westin's work is too individualistic, which leads to the conclusion
that Westin regarded "privacy as fundamentally at odds with social
interests"4 0 when that is clearly not the case. 41 Moreover, criticism is
leveled at privacy as control from the seemingly tautological
42
perspective that privacy as control is either too broad or too narrow.
The conceptual reach of privacy as control has also been subject
to criticism particularly regarding issues of individual consent. Allen
contends there is a fundamental disconnect between what can be
considered as having control over personal information and the
requirements of a sufficient state of privacy because the former is not
necessarily a constituent element of the latter.43 Instead, privacy as
control directs attention to issues of consent and choice about uses of
personal information that connote an element of inaccessibility
separate from privacy considerations.44 Finally, the control aspect of
information privacy has also been subject to criticism. 4 5 Simitis
contends that privacy considerations no longer arise out of individual
problems, but instead express conflicts that affect everyone.46
Information privacy is thus not simply a problem of individual control
*
47
over information.
Despite these trenchant criticisms, the concept of privacy as
control was the basis for information privacy legislation 4 8 and the

40. REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY, supra note 33, at 28. See also BENNETT & RAAB,
GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 50 (contending that Westin undertook a functional
view regarding his investigation of privacy for an individual); Margulis, supra note 31, at 413
(stating that Westin's work takes an individualistic perspective about the societal role of
information privacy).
41. REGAN, LEGISLATING PIVACY, supra note 33, at 220 ("1 argue that privacy's
importance does not stop with the individual and that recognition of the social importance of
privacy will clear a path for more serious policy discourse about privacy and for the formulation
of more effective public policy to protect privacy").
42. See Solove, supra note 34, at 1115 (contending that privacy as control is too vague
due to the failure to define the types of information that individuals should control whilst other
theories overcompensate and becoming too limiting).
43. See Anita L Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical,and MoralLimits
of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 867-68 (2000) (regarding the differences between
physical and informational privacy).
44. Id. at 869 (stating that informational privacy involves information in a state of
inaccessibility).
45. See Austin, supranote 21, at 125-26.
46. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707,
709 (1987).
47. Id.
48. BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 8 (commenting that
the policy problem of "privacy" settled on the concept of information privacy).
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development of what we recognize as "data protection" 49 or
"information privacy" 50 or even "privacy""1 laws. Three legal
instruments developed in the 1970s and 1980s have been integral to
the development of information privacy law as we know it today.52 In
Europe, the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data by Council of Europe5 was
a cornerstone for the European Union's subsequent Data Protection
Directive.54 In the US, an influential report produced by the US
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare55 led to the
implementation of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Code of Fair
Information Practice for Federal Government Agencies. 5 6 Finally,
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
(OECD) developed guidelines5 7 for member countries relating to the
transfer of personal information between member states which is a
significant driver regarding the formulation of member state national
legislation.
The originating legal instruments and subsequent laws have
many common features.5 9 They are imbued on a principle of fairness

49.

See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31 (EU) [hereinafter Council

Directive 95/46]; Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (UK).

50. See, e.g., Information Privacy Act, 2000 (Vict. Acts); Information Privacy Act, 2009
(Queensl. Stat.).
See, e.g., Privacy Act, 1988 (Austl.); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1974).
51.
52. RULE, supra note 24, at 25, 29 (regarding the effect of the three instruments on the
overall development of information privacy law); BENNETT supra note 21, at 95-101 (regarding
the development of fair information principles through different international legal instruments).
53. Eur. Consult. Assoc., Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic
Processing
of
Personal
Data
(1981),
available
at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.htm.
54.
Council Directive 95/46.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
55.
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED
available
at
DATA
SYSTEMS
(1973),
PERSONAL
HEW
[hereinafter
http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCIl973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm
REPORT].
56.
See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, ET AL., INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2d ed. 2006) (citing
HEW REPORT at 23-30, 41-42).
57.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], GUIDELINES ON THE
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980), available at

http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,es_2649_34255_1815186 1_1 1_l,00.html.
58. See Michael Kirby, Twenty-five Years of Evolving Information Privacy Law--Where
Have We Come From and Where Are We Going?, 21 PROMETHEUS 467 (2003) (regarding
implementation of the Guidelines in Australia and New Zealand); LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA
PROTECTION LAW: APPROACHING ITS RATIONALE, LOGIC AND LIMITS 32 (Kluwer Law
International 2002) (noting that the treaty has been ratified by twenty-seven member states).
59.

See BYGRAVE, supra note 58, at 32; REBECCA A. GRANT & COLIN J. BENNETT,
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and they adopt organizational-oriented controls relating to the process
of personal information processing.60 A series of "fair information
practices" 61 or "information privacy principles" 62 stipulate minimum
standards regarding the collection, storage, and use of personal
information by data collecting organizations have thus emerged to
regulate the process of personal information exchange. While the
genesis of information privacy laws can be traced back to these three
roots causing subsequent laws to share similar features, a fundamental
divergence has occurred. This divergence has caused the US to adopt
the sectoral approach and the EU and non-EU states of the OECD to
adopt the comprehensive approach, as outlined in Part III.A.
B. Data Breach Notification Law
Although forms of mandatory data breach notification existed
prior to the development of US state-based laws, 64 the inception of
these laws are normally associated with US state-based legislatures,
particularly the California data breach notification law that was
enacted in 2003.65 That law requires any California business to notify
California residents an existing or potential data breach that includes
an unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted and computerized
personal information,.66 Individuals are to be notified within a

VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 6 (University of Toronto Press

1999).
60. See, e.g., RULE, supra note 24, at 27 ("the workings of personal data systems [are]
open, accountable, and subject to known rules of due process"). See also Viktor MayerSchonberger, GenerationalDevelopment of Data Protection in Europe, in TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 221 (Philip Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (describing
the European advances in data storage and protection).
61. See, e.g., Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY:
THE NEW LANDSCAPE 195-202 (Philip Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (regarding the
development of fair information practices arising out of the HEW Report and subsequent
implementation through the Privacy Act of 1974).
62.

See, e.g., GRAHAM GREENLEAF,

ET AL.,

STRENGTHENING UNIFORM PRIVACY

PRINCIPLES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ALRC's PROPOSED PRINCIPLES, available at
http://www.bakercyberlawcentre.org/ipp/publications/papers/ALRCDP72_UPPsfinal.pdf
(regarding the application of Australia's privacy principles).
63. See, e.g., BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 12
(outlining the impact of fair information practices on the jurisdictional development of
information privacy law).
64. See, e.g., Ethan Preston & Paul Turner, The Global Rise of a Duty to Disclose
Information Security Breaches, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 457, 465 (2004)
(regarding security breach notification under the EU's e-Privacy Directive which came into
force in 2002).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2003).
66. Id.
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timeframe that is expedient and without reasonable delay.67
Notification can take different forms including by letter, electronic
notification, or substitute notice68 which entails "conspicuous
posting" 69 on the organization's website or via state media sources.
However, some data breaches are exempt from notification. These
include "good faith acquisitions" 70 of personal information by an
employee or agent of the breached entity7 I and encrypted personal
information.7 2 The type of personal information required to be
notified also provides a limiting factor. Unlike information privacy
laws, data breach notification laws have specific requirements as to
what constitutes information to be regulated.73
The purpose of the California law and most other subsequent
data breach notification laws is directly linked to the mitigation of
identity theft. 74 The law was introduced to the California legislature
67. However, law enforcement agencies can request a delay if notification would impede
a criminal investigation. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2003). Time frames also vary
between different states. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005) (within 45 days); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); WIs. STAT. § 134.98 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. §6-1-716
(2006) (as quickly as possible); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-102 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 28-51104 (Michie 2006).
68. Under the Californian law, substitute notice is only available if the data breach
involved more than half a million individuals or would exceed a cost of over $250,000. Id. Other
states vary on this point. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (2007) (breach involves over
200,000 persons and cost exceeds more than $100,000) and N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20
(2007) (breach involves over 1,000 persons and cost exceeds $5,000).
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2003).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); Wis. STAT. § 134.97 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 6-1-716 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-102 (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2009);
ARIz. REV. STAT. §44-7501 (2007); ARK. STAT. §45.48.010 (Michie 2009); D.C. CODE ANN. §
28-3851 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5 (2005); IND.
CODE § 24-4.9-2-2 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch.93H, § 1(2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-802 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.220 (2006);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §56:8-163 (West 2006); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAWS §§ 899-aa (2005); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 51-30-02 (2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 3113.1 (2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.602
(2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2005); TEX. BUS.
& COM. CODE. § 521.053 (Vernon 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2005); W. VA.
CODE § 46A-2A-101 (2008).
72. See, e.g., Mark Burdon, Jason Reid & Rouhshi Low, Encryption Safe Harboursand
Data Breach Notification Laws, 26 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REv. 520 (2010) [hereinafter
Burdon et al., EncryptionSafe Harbors].
73. This point is covered in depth below at Part W.A.
74. See, e.g., CAL. OFFICE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON
NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PERSONAL INFORMATION, at 6 (2009) ("One of the

most significant privacy laws in recent years is the California law intended to give individuals
early warning when their personal information has fallen into the hands of an unauthorized
person, so that they can take steps to protect themselves against identity theft or to mitigate the
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as Senate Bill 1386 (hereafter "SB1386"), but at its point of
introduction SB1386 bore no resemblance to the data breach
notification law into which it would eventually evolve.7 5 A radical rewrite was undertaken following a computer hacking incident at a data
processing warehouse that the California State Government
maintains. 76 An unidentified intruder gained access to the
Government's information systems and retrieved the personal
information of approximately 265,000 California public servants.77
The state held an informational hearing into the incident, and it
became apparent that the state government delayed notification to its
employees.78 Evidence presented during the hearing attributed several
attempts of identity theft to the data breach. 7 9 As a consequence of the
breach, SB1386 was therefore radically re-drafted and redesigned to
crime's impact."); Amanda Draper, Comment, Identity Theft: Plugging the Massive DataLeaks
with a StricterNationwide Breach-notificationLaw, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 681, 686 (2007)
(noting that high profile data breaches in credit card processing corporations have been an
incentive for the development of new laws); Kenneth M Siegel, Comment, Protectingthe Most
Valuable CorporateAsset: Electronic Data,Identity Theft, PersonalInformation, and the Role
ofData Security in the InformationAge, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 779, 781 (2007) (highlighting the
identity theft risks that can arise from a single data breach); Regan, supra note 10, at 1105-06
(regarding the impact that major data breaches had on Congressional developments relating to a
national data breach notification law); Lilia Rode, Database Security Breach Notification
Statutes: Does Placingthe Responsibility on the True Victim IncreaseData Security?, 43 HOUS.
L. REV. 1597, 1621 (2007) ("California's Notification Act has an admirable goal to curb identity
theft."); Sara A. Needles, Comment, The Data Game: Learning to Love the State-Based
Approach to Data Breach Notification Law, 88 N.C. L. REV. 267, 281 (2009) ("Much of data
breach law has been enacted to deal with the threat of identity theft resulting from unauthorized
access of computerized records."); Jennifer A. Chandler, Negligence Liabilityfor Breaches of
Data Security, 23 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 223, 229 (2008) (highlighting potential mitigation
benefits in relation to identity theft).
75. See S.B. 1386 (Introduced), 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), available at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01 -02/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020212 introduced.pdf
(a bill concerned with exempting the disclosure of personal information under the auspices of
Californian freedom of information law). See also Joseph Simitian, How a Bill Becomes Law,
Really, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009 (2009) (regarding the background development of some
of the key issues relating to notification under the Californian law).
76. PersonalInformation: Disclosure; Breach Of Security: Before the Assem. Comm. on
(Cal. 2002), availible at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_1351Judiciary
1400/sb 1386_cfa_20020617_141710_asm comm.html. See also Preston & Turner, supra note
64, at 459 (regarding the effect on the attack on the development of the law); Timothy H.
Skinner, California's Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First State Breach
Notification Law is Not Yet a Suitable Template for NationalIdentity Theft Legislation, 10 RICH.
J. L. & TECH. 4 (2003) (confirming the impact of the breach on the law's development); Jane
Winn, Are 'Better' Security Breach Notification Laws Possible?,24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1133,
1142-43 (2009) (providing a brief outline of the background development to California's law).
77. S.B. 1386 (Introduced),2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002).
78. See Skinner, supra note 76, at 4 (regarding details of the delay).
79. See id. at 5 (providing details of the hearing in which attempts at identity theft were
examined but could not be conclusively tied to the data breach).
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provide immediate notification for the purposes of identity theft
mitigation.80 Despite the fact that data breach notification laws are
designed to mitigate identity theft, subsequent research critically
questions whether the link between data breaches and identity theft is
as strong as initially indicated.
The California law dramatically impacted the uptake of data
breach notification laws in other state legislatures.. 82 A majority of
state-based laws are largely based on the California model, but some
84
state laws have adopted different notification triggers. Acquisition
80.

See, e.g., Simitian, supranote 75, at 1011 (regarding the impetus for legislative action

following the data breach).
81.
See, e.g., JAVELIN STRATEGY AND RESEARCH, DATA BREACHES AND IDENTITY
FRAUD: MISUNDERSTANDING COULD FAIL CONSUMERS AND BURDEN BUSINESSES (2006)
(conducting a study of identity theft victims which demonstrated that a small percentage was
linked to data breaches); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-07-737, PERSONAL
INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY
THEFT Is LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN (2007) (reviewing twenty-four
large data breaches to find little evidence of concomitant identity theft incidents); Sasha

Romanosky, et al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft? (Carnegie Mellon
University),

30 J.

OF POL'Y

ANALYSIS

& MGMT.

(forthcoming

2011),

available at

http://ssm.com/abstract=1268926 (analyzing identity theft complaints from victims and finding
little evidence that data breach notification laws reduce the frequency of identity theft incidents);
Brendan St. Amant, Recent Development, Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in TriggeringPublic
Notice of Database Breaches, 44 Harv. J. on Legis. 527 (2007) ("The currently favored costbenefit analysis that links security breaches to identity theft obscures the central policy issue of

what actual rights citizens should have over the whereabouts and release of their personal
information."); FRED H. CATE, INFORMATION SECURITY BREACHES: LOOKING BACK AND
at
available
AHEAD
(2008),
THINKING
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl-s47Details/FileUpload265/2308/InformationSecurityBreach
esCate.pdf ("Identity fraud and security breaches are both certainly important issues, but there
is little evidence connecting the two, especially in the case of true identity theft.").

82. See Burdon, et al., Mandatory Notification of Data Breaches, supra note 5, at 117
(chronicling the uptake of data breach notification laws post the inception of the Californian
law). See also Flora J. Garcia, Comment, Data Protection, Breach Notification, and the
Interplay between State and Federal Law: The Experiments Need More Time, 17 FORDHAM
INTEL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 693, 707-08 (2007) (regarding the rapid proliferation of statebased data breach notification laws).
83.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(A) (West 2003); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); Wis.
STAT. § 134.98 (2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (2006); 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12B § 102
(2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-105 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2009); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-110-105 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5
(2005); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 603A.220 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (WEST 2006); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 899-AA (MCKINNEY 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-02 (2005); OKLA.

STAT. tit. 74

§ 3113.1

(2006); S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 39-1-90

(2009); TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 47-18-

2107 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE. ANN. § 521.053 (VERNON 2007); WASH. REV. CODE §
19.255.010 (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36A-701B (SUPP. 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
51:3074 (2005); MINN. STAT. § 325E.61 (2006); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2009); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-49.2-3 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-44-202 (2006).

84.

See Kathryn E. Picanso, Comment, Protecting Information Security Under a Unform

Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 383 (2006) (outlining states with a

2011]

INFORMATION PRIVACY & DATA BREACH

77

based triggers, such as the California law, have a relatively low
triggering threshold8 5 that triggers an obligation to notify when an
organization has suffered, or believes it has suffered a breach.86 Risk
based triggers, on the other hand, attempt to raise the triggering
threshold to minimize the threat of unnecessary notification.87 These
triggers have a range of different standards that include: a reasonable
likelihood of harm or material harm,88 a reasonable likelihood of
substantial economic loss, 89 a significant or material risk of identity
theft or other frauds, 90 and whether a data breach has or is reasonably
likely to cause loss or injury.
In the US, laws have been enacted at the state level, and the
situation at the federal level has some parallels to state-based law.
First, there was an explosion of interest in data breach notification law
leading to a proliferation of legal proposals in 2005 that has continued
until the present time. 9 2 None of these bills have been enacted yet

reasonable risk of harm trigger); Michael E. Jones, Comment, Data Breaches: Recent
Developments in the Public and Private Sectors, 3 1/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 555, 57172 (2007) (detailing the use of risk based triggers in federal data breach proposals).
85. See Garcia, supra note 82, at 704 (triggering notification even if only reasonably
believed acquired without actual use).
86. See Jones, supra note 84, at 562 (regarding the elements of acquisition based triggers
that are deemed to favor consumer protection because notification is not left to the breached
entity); Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105
MICH. L. REv. 913, 933 (2007) (commenting the California law "is marked by a low threshold
for notification").
87. See CATE, supra note 81, at 13 ("Requiring breach notices in situations other than
those in which they are realistically likely to prevent or mitigate harm or serve some other
clearly articulated valuable function threatens to exacerbate the existing tendency of recipients
to ignore those notices"); MICHAEL TURNER, TOWARDS A RATIONAL PERSONAL DATA BREACH

NOTIFICATION REGIME (2006), http://perc.net/files/downloads/data breach.pdf ("At some point,
consumers begin to discount notices if the average likelihood that a breach will result in damage
is very low"); Jones, supra note 84, at 562 (regarding risk based triggers that are deemed to
favor corporate interests because the decision to notify or not is left squarely with the breached
organization).
88. See, e.g., FLA STAT. § 817.5681 (2005); ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2009); ARK.
CODE ANN. §4-110-105 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.600 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a701b (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3071 (2005); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005).
89. See ARIz. REv. STAT. §44-7501 (2007).
90. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. § 134.98 (2006); MD.
CODE. ANN. COM. LAW §§ 14-3501 (2008); MASS GEN. LAW ch. 93H §1 (2007); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-49.2-1 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-42-101 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 507a01 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS §445.72 (2007).
91. See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2303 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.72 (2007); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (2008).
92. See Regan, supra note 10, at 1109-110 (outlining bills placed before both Houses of
Congress).
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although this may be about to change. 3
The purposes of the bills varied. For example, some bills sought
to develop a national, federal-based data breach notification law to
supplant state-based laws.94 Other bills responded to specific data
breach incidents 95 and further bills covered certain industrial sectors
such as the data brokerage industry 9 6 or Federal government agencies.
97 Second, the proposed federal bills share the same underlying
rationale of state-based laws that the primary function of data breach
notification was to provide individuals with an opportunity to mitigate
any potential adverse outcomes, thus assisting with the prevention of
identity theft-related crimes.98
Accordingly, data breach notification laws attempt to fulfill two
differing conceptual aims. First, the law primarily seeks to formally
recognize that an individual has a "right to know" about unauthorized
misuse of his or her personal information and notice of the incident
enables mitigation of subsequent identity theft. 99 Smedinghoff
contends that the reporting of personal information data breaches is
akin to the common law duty to warn of dangers.' 0 0 The duty requires
93. See Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2009, H.R. 2221, 111 th Cong. (2009).
94. See, e.g., id.; Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong.
(2009); Data Breach Notification Act of 2009, S. 139, 11Ith Cong. (2009).
95. See, e.g., Veterans' ID Theft Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 5487, 109th Cong. (2006);
Comprehensive Credit Services for Veterans Act of 2006, H.R. 5783, 109th Cong. (2006);
Comprehensive Veterans' Data Protection and Identity Theft Protection Act of2006, H.R. 5577,
109th Cong. (2006) (following the aftermath of a major data breach involving the US
Government's Department of Veterans Affairs). See also DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF ISSuEs RELATED TO THE LOSS OF VA
INFORMATION INVOLVING THE IDENTITY OF MILLIONS OF VETERANS (2006) (for extensive

details of the breach).
96. See, e.g., Identity Theft Bill, H.R. 3140, 109th Cong. (2005).
97. See, e.g., Federal Agency Data Breach Notification Act of 2006, H.R. 5838, 109th
Cong. (2006); Federal Agency Data Breach Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 2124, 110th Cong.
(2007).
98. See, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490, 111th Cong.
(2009) ("To prevent and mitigate identity theft, to ensure privacy, to provide notice of security
breaches, and to enhance criminal penalties, law enforcement assistance, and other protections
against security breaches, fraudulent access, and misuse of personally identifiable information").
99. See, e.g., Rode, supra note 74, at 1621 (commenting that the purpose of the
Californian law was to provide consumers with greater knowledge in order they could take
action); Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Trends in the Law oflnformation Security, 17 INTEL. PROP. &
TECH. L. J. 1, 4 (2005) (stating that data breach notification laws are designed as a way to
protect persons who may be adversely affected by a security breach); Needles, supranote 74, at
380 (stating "Breach notification laws let individuals know that their data has slipped into
unauthorized hands"); Schwartz & Janger,supra note 86, at 917 (stating that breach notification
can assist individuals and organizations to mitigate harm caused by a breach).
100. Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The State of Information Security Law: A Focus on the Key
Legal
Trends
(May
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
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a party who has a superior knowledge of a potential danger of injury
or damage that could be inflicted upon another person, by a specific
hazard, to warn persons who lack such knowledge.o Data breach
notification law was thus intended to provide an ex post protection for
individuals and mandatory notification was deemed the regulatory
tool to complete that task. 102
Second, the auxiliary aim of the law is to encourage
organizations to adopt better security practices.103 Encryption safe
harbors are a case point as they seek to encourage the wider adoption
of encryption technologies for the storage and use of personal
information. 104 However, notification also acts as a regulatory threat
through the tool of reputational sanction as breached organizations
have to confess the incident to their customers.os Both
encouragement and threat elements are designed to ensure that sound
information management procedures and practices become a

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=l 114246.
101. Id. By requiring notice to persons who may be adversely affected by a security breach
(e.g., persons whose compromised personal information may be used to facilitate identity theft),
these laws seek to provide such persons with a warning that their personal information has been
compromised, and an opportunity to take steps to protect themselves against the consequences
of identity theft.
102. See Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data
Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1072-74 (2009)
(regarding an overview of information disclosure measures as an ex post mechanism in data
breach notification laws).
103. See, e.g., id. at 1075 (notification as an information disclosure mechanism is used to
improve organizational security controls); Winn, supra note 76, at 1147-48 (regarding the
incentives for database owners to implement security measures); Rode, supra note 74, at 1624
("notification statutes ... serve as powerful incentives for businesses to attack identity theft at
the front lines"); Skinner, supra note 76, at 7 (quoting Benjamin Wright "they [data breach
notification laws] have powerful incentive (sic) to secure data from the beginning"); Schwartz &
Janger, supra note 86, at 953-55 (regarding "reasonable security" measures that the "ideal data
processing entity" would put in place from a data breach notification act).
104. See generally Burdon et al., Encryption Safe Harbours,supra note 72 (providing a
detailed critique of encryption safe harbors in data breach notification laws); MARK BURDON, ET
AL., IF IT'S ENCRYPTED IT'S SECURE! THE VIABILITY OF US STATE-BASED ENCRYPTION

EXEMPTIONS (IEEE 2010) [hereinafter BURDON, ET AL., VIABILITY], available at
http://eprints.qut.edu.au32781/l/c32781.pdf (analyzing encryption exemptions found in US
state-based data breach notification laws against a factor-based safe harbor proposed in
Australia and the EU); Winn, supra note 76, at 1145-46 (critiquing the California law's
encryption safe harbor). See also Part II.B below.
105. See, e.g., Winn, supra note 76, at 1143 (stating that the "shaming function" of data
breach notification laws is a "direct and concrete" element); Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86,
at 929-31 (detailing in depth the role of "reputational sanction" in data breach notification laws);
Rode, supra note 74, at 1628 (regarding the disclosure of a security breach which can tarnish a
company's public image).
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management priority. 106 This reflects the fact that there was little
market incentive for private sector organizations to behave
responsibly and to report a data breach due to the negative publicity
that would arise. 0 7 As such, the second aim of data breach
notification law also has an ex ante element through the encouraged
adoption of information security measures. 0 8 Nevertheless these are
two very different aims that arise from data breach incidents.' 0 9 Data
breach notification laws therefore demand a delicate balancing act
that requires gauging the risks of providing adequate notification to
individuals while attempting to minimize corporate compliance cost
0
burdens relating to unnecessary notification.o"
C Summary
This brief overview of the conceptual background and legislative
development of both information privacy and data breach notification
laws reveal similarities and differences between both legal concepts.
Both laws have an obvious interest relating to the protection of
personal information and they both attempt to provide individuals
with a greater knowledge about the use of their personal information

106. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86, at 926 (regarding the various forces that are
formed under data breach notification law).
107. See COMPUTER SECURITY INSTITUTE, COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY
(2006), available at http://pdf.textfiles.com/security/fbi2006.pdf (detailing the reluctance of
organizations to inform law enforcement agencies about a data breach); ALESSANDRO
ACQUISTI, ET AL., Is THERE A COST TO PRIVACY BREACHES? AN EVENT STUDY 4 (2006),
available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2006/94/ ("a privacy incident is a negative externality that
natural incentives cannot correct"); Chandler, supra note 74, at 228 (regarding the lack of
consumer interest in data breaches and the limited effect on share price as an effective deterrent
to implement security measures); Rode, supranote 74, at 1631 (regarding the ineffectiveness of
market based provisions when businesses miscalculate the value placed by individuals on
privacy). See contra Jacob W. Schneider, Preventing Data Breaches: Alternative Approaches to
Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 279, 291 (2009)
(stating that the ineffectiveness of data breach notification as a legal remedy because it provides
little market incentive to strengthen data security).
108. See Romanosky & Acquisti, supra note 102 (regarding the ex ante role of security
protections to reduce the numbers of future data breaches).
109. See Needles, supranote 74, at 281 (noting the different purposes between data breach
notification as "data control" and as a "privacy" concern); Turner, supra note 87 (regarding the
conflicting notions of notification to individuals and the use of notification as an incentive to
strengthen security).
110. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86, at 918 (regarding the "important function of
breach notification" after a breach that requires a "multi-institutional, co-ordinated response");
Schwartz, supra note 36; Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Security Breach Notification - Adapting to
the Regulatory Framework, 21 The Review of Banking & Financial Services 115 (2005);
Turner, supra note 87 (regarding the risks that organizations face in decision to notify or not to
notify).
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by organizations. Despite these obvious similarities, there are also
significant differences between the two laws that go to the heart of
both concepts and different legal frameworks. To outline these
distinctions, the metaphor of vertical and horizontal is employed to
determine tensions shared weaknesses."' These issues are explored
further in the next parts of this article and represented by figure 1
below.
Fig. 1 - Vertical Tensions and Horizontal Weaknesses

Data Breach Notification Law
Market-based Initiatives

Sectoral Approach

I

k

Shared Horizontal Weakness
Within Each Law
Focus on type of information

Focus on chains of accountability

Conflicting Vertical
Tension Between Each
Law

Comprehensive Approach

Rights-based Protections
Information Privacy Law

111. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE
L.J. 868, 872-73 (2009) (regarding the classification of dimensions relating to US information
privacy law as vertical issues, such as the desirability of a comprehensive federal law over statebased laws and horizontal issues which regard "the interplay of any federal information privacy
law with other sector-Specific federal rules").
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III. CONFLICTING VERTICAL TENSIONS

Vertical tensions emanate due to the differing conceptual and
developmental origins of both laws that ultimately represent the
distinction between sectoral and comprehensive approaches to the
regulation of information privacy. 1 12 The author asserts that the
sectoral/comprehensive distinction also determines the form of
regulatory remedy that is deemed appropriate which further highlight
distinctions between market-based initiatives and rights-based
protections that result in contradictory emphases over the
minimization of corporate compliance costs.
A. Sectoral Versus Comprehensive Approaches
The implementations of information privacy laws have taken
essentially different tracks despite their similar origins.,3 That in
itself is not surprising as a right to privacy is not perceived as an
absolute right and thus the interpretation of the emphasis given to an
individual's right to control his or her personal information is in
competition with other social rights and interests. The application of
information privacy legal regimes is likely to be a matter of
contestable discussion amongst different legislative jurisdictions. 114
As such, information privacy laws are manifestations of political
processes which have implications for the implementable scope of
such laws.115 Jurisdictional information privacy laws therefore reflect
112. The author acknowledges that the distinction between sectoral and comprehensive
frameworks is a broad categorization only and notes that some comprehensive laws also have
aspects of sectoral regulation. See BENNETr & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note
20, at 132-33 (highlighting that the sectoral/comprehensive distinction is broad in its conceptual
reach and that in practice several countries encompass aspects of both approaches within their
legal systems). However, this broad distinction is sufficient for the purposes of this article
because it demonstrates the different conceptual, normative and regulatory foundations of US
data breach notification law when examined in conjunction with comprehensive information
privacy regimes.
113. See BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 3-6 (stating that
human need for privacy is "manifested to different degrees and in different ways from culture to
culture").
114. See, e.g., Charles Raab, From Balancing to Steering: New Directions for Data
Protection, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 68 (Colin J.

Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999) (regarding the limited role of a right to privacy which does
not take precedence over all uses of personal information); REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY,
supra note 33, at 16 (regarding privacy protection in the US as the balancing of individual and
political interests); BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 13 (stating
that privacy is not an absolute right and is balanced against other community rights and
obligations).
115. BENNErr & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 125 (contending that
information privacy law is "an exercise of the power of the state in regulating the processing of
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the wider social, legal and policy values of individual jurisdictions." 6
The US attitude towards information privacy law and the
developmental purpose of data breach notification laws reflect this
point.
The sectoral approach"' 7 to information privacy in the US has
been characterized as "sporadic"" 8 and "reactive."ll 9 The regulatory
focus of US information privacy law is the general curtailment of
government powers in combination with laws that govern industryspecific practices or various types of sensitive information. 20 The
existence or non-existence of information privacy regulation at the
federal level is specific to particular circumstances or sectors. For
example, the Privacy Act' 2 ' provides a range of fair information
practices that US Government agencies must comply with regarding
the handling of personal information. The Gramm Leach Bliley Act'22
(GLBA) creates privacy protections for personal financial information
within the specific remit of the financial services sector. The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)1 23 consigns
personal data").
116. See BENNETT, supra note 21, at 242-43 (regarding the effect of different political
philosophies on the implementation of information privacy legislation); PETER P. SWIRE &
ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,
AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 153 (1998) (contending that different approaches to
privacy protection reflect unique jurisdictional approaches).
117. See Gellman, supra note 61, at 195 (describing sectoral as "no general privacy laws,
just specific laws covering specific records or record keepers"); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption
and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 910 (2009) (US information privacy laws "regulate
information use exclusively on a sector-by-sector basis").
118. See Joel R. Reidenberg, The Globalization of Privacy Solutions: The Movement
Towards ObligatoryStandardsfor FairInformation Practices, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY
CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE, 217 (Colin J. Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontierfor IndividualRights?,
44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 236 (1992) (stating that the lack of a coherent and systematic approach
to information privacy protection in the US "presents an undesirable policy void"); John T.
Soma et al., Corporate Privacy Trend: The "Value" of Personally Identifiable Information
("PH") Equals the "Value" of FinancialAssets, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15 (2009) (stating
that US privacy regulation is best described as "a haphazard set of industry specific
regulations ...which frequently overlap and are often contradictory"); Gellman, supra note 61, at
195 (describing the legal structure for US privacy protection as a "patchwork quilt").
119. See BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 37 (regarding
reactivity as a weakness of sectoral regimes).
120. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 118, at 209 (stating that US federal and state
information privacy laws target individual protection in relation to defined problems that arise
from fear of government intervention and a reluctance to regulate industry).
121. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U. S.C. § 552a (2006).
122. Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§
6801-6809 (2006).
123. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162,
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legal protections in relation to identifiable health information held in
the medical and health insurance sectors. In a different vein, the
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)1 24 governs
restrictions on the collection of online personal information from
children under the age of thirteen.
Alongside these sector-based laws, there are a collection of other
laws that provide legal remedies for specific issues that have become
sufficiently politicized to warrant legislative action.12 5 For example,
the Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) restricts the disclosure of
driver license information by state authorities. 126 The DPPA was a
legislative response to the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer where
an assailant used publicly available driver license information to stalk
and then murder the victim. 12 The DPPA has also been instrumental
in restricting the sale of driver license information by state agencies to
commercial entities. 12 8 The Video Privacy Protection Act1 29 protects
personal information provided to video rental stores following a
controversy involving Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork and the
media's publication of his video watching habits.13 0
The myriad of information privacy legislation has also been
replicated at the state level.'
Some states implement laws that
provide general statutory rights of privacy that are akin to tort law

164 (2006).
124. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006).
125. See BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 37; REGAN,
LEGISLATING PRIVACY, supra note 33, at 199 (stating that congressional privacy legislation was
based on various critical events which opened up a policy window); Priscilla Regan, The United
States, in GLOBAL PRIVACY PROTECTION: THE FIRST GENERATION 51 (James B. Rule &
Graham Greenleaf eds., 2008) ("Generally it takes an incident to focus attention on the issue of
information privacy - and such incidents tend to focus on one type of record system at a time.").
126. Drivers Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2725 (2006).
127. See, e.g., SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY supra note 19, at 69 (regarding the
distinction between public and private data in the Schaeffer case); Garcia, supra note 82, at 715
(stating the "Schaeffer case is credited with sparking the passage of the Drivers' Privacy
Protection Act"). See also REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY, supra note 33, at 207 (regarding the
use of state driver license information to harass pregnant mothers who visited abortion clinics).
128. See, e.g., Michael A. Froomkin, Government Data Breaches, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1019, 1029 (2009) (noting the importance of the DPPA to state agencie).; Garcia, supra
note 82, at 715 (highlighting state revenues based from the sale of driver license information);
Regan, supra note 125, at 50 (summarizing the development of the DPPA).
129. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
130. See Schwartz, supranote 117, at 935-36 (providing a comprehensive overview to the
development of the law including details of congressional outrage).
131.
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier
for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 221 (1992) (commenting that state-based
protections suffer from incompleteness and that state-based protections vary from state to state).

2011]

INFORMATION PRIVACY & DATA BREACH

85

protections and thus govern areas such as common law invasions of
privacy. 132 Other states, like their federal counterpart, have enacted a
number of sectoral based laws that are aimed at certain industry
practices. For example, in addition to federal laws, some states have
specifically legislated laws relating to the use of personal information
in relation to certain information, such as video rental records, as
highlighted above. 13 Accordingly, Schwartz contends that a duopoly
exists between federal and state laws in which federal laws deliver
specified benchmarks that allow state laws further room for

experimental development. 134
Comprehensive legal frameworks, on the other hand, adopt a
different approach to sectoral regimes. They establish information
privacy rights for individuals and define obligations for data
sector.13 5
collecting organizations regardless of industrial
Comprehensive frameworks have universal notions of the type of
information that is covered by information privacy laws, typically
defined as "personal data" 3 6 or "personal information."1 37 Moreover,
the type of data covered by these laws is generally context dependent
which means that different types of information can be personal
information at different times depending upon the context upon which
it is used.13 8 The context dependent approach is a significant
difference to sectoral laws that have a restrictive outlook of the type
of information that will constitute personal information. Hence,
sectoral information privacy laws have developed contextindependent approaches related to the classification of personal
information that reflect the restricted aims of industry or information
specific legislation.
comprehensive
operated by
mechanisms
Enforcement
information privacy regimes are also different to those found in
sectoral regimes. Most comprehensive frameworks employ specific
132. Id. at 228.
133. See Schwartz, supra note 117, at 919 (regarding state variants on the VPPA).
134. Id.; but see Bellia, supra note 111, at 873.
135. See, e.g., Council Directive 95/46, Art 7, 1995 O.J. (L281) (EC).
136. Council Directive 95/46, Art 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
137. S6(1) PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) (Austri.).
138. See, e.g., Mark Burdon & Paul Telford, The Conceptual Basis of Personal
Information in AustralianPrivacy Law, 17 Murdoch Elaw Journal 1 (2010) [hereinafter Burdon
& Telford, Conceptual Basis] (regarding an overview of context independent and context
dependent approaches in Australian privacy law); See also SHARON BOOTH ET AL., WHAT ARE
'PERSONAL DATA'? A STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE UK INFORMATION COMMISSIONER 6 (2004)

(regarding a survey of data protection authorities and their conceptual construction of personal
information).
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supervisory authorities with given sets of legislative powers to protect
the rights of individuals and impose compliance obligations upon
organizations and are seen as a necessary condition of an effective
information privacy regime. 139 Contrast that with the situation in the
US, which does not have a dedicated supervisory authority for the
enforcement of information privacy. Instead, governance obligations
are dispersed amongst different public sector organizations that mirror
the fragmented legislative focus of the US approach.14 0 Moreover, the
lack of a unified commission is now seen as a detriment to the US
approach to information privacy.14 1
Data breach notification laws have thus been developed within
the sectoral environment of the US to provide a remedial fix to a
given problem, namely, the mitigation of identity theft arising from
data breaches of personal information. 142 However, a law that has a
primary purpose of mitigating identity theft is fundamentally different
from a law that is purposely designed to ensure the protection of
personal information as found in comprehensive information privacy
regimes.14 3 The former is designed to provide a particular remedy to a
specific problem while the latter consigns broad rights to individuals
regarding the personal information exchange process. The question
consequently arises whether data breach notification laws should
regard the protection of personal information per se, as information
privacy laws do, rather than focusing on the specified remit of
mitigating identity theft?
These are weighty normative distinctions for to do so require a
major change in perspective, from both sectoral and comprehensive
approaches, regarding the purpose of data breach notification. There
is a clear conceptual foundation for a narrower approach to the
protection of personal information in data breach notification laws
139.

BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 113 (noting the

European Union's approach to privacy laws).
140. E.g., eight federal agencies have supervisory powers to enforce elements of the
GLBA. They are the Federal Trade Commission; The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency;
The Federal Reserve Board; The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; The Office of the
Thrift Supervision; The National Credit Union Administration; The Security and Exchange
Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON RESPONSE PROGRAMS FOR
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO CUSTOMER INFORMATION AND CUSTOMER NOTICE (2005),

http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/2/2523l.pdf.
141.
See Schwartz, supra note 117, at 927 (regarding one of the positive effects of a
comprehensive law in the US).
142. Id. at 929-31.
143. See, e.g., Winn, supra note 76, at 1134 (regarding the potential limiting implications
of data breach notification laws that predominantly focus on the mitigation of identity theft).
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that goes back to the first data breach notification law, California
Civil Code 1729(a), and flows through to recent US state and federal
developments. However, even in comprehensive jurisdictions, there
has been a degree of reluctance to enmesh data breach notification
completely within established legal frameworks. 1" This has resulted
in the EU's data breach notification scheme being developed within
the reduced scope of the e-Privacy Directive and the Australian Law
Reform Commission's proposal that has not only developed an
ancillary definition of personal information for the specific purpose of
data breach notification, 145 but has recommended that data breach
notification not be formalized as a privacy principle. 146
Data breach notification law, viewed from the perspective of the
type of information privacy legal framework within which it operates,
provides a contradictory picture about how it has been applied. In the
US, data breach notification law is a comprehensive measure to
remedy deficiencies arising from the sectoral approach to information
privacy. 147 The comprehensiveness of the law is evident because it
generally applies to all types of organization regardless of industrial
sector. 14 8 However, the application of this comprehensive approach is
nevertheless constrained by focusing notification to specified
circumstances that could give rise to identity theft which involve
certain types of combined personal information. Conversely, data
breach notification law in comprehensive regimes is a sectoral
measure to remedy deficiencies in the application of fair information
practices or information privacy principles that regard corporate
obligations to secure personal information.149 In effect, the
notifications resulting from the advent of data breach notification
laws demonstrate that the application of security-related principles
and practices simply are not working both in terms of the volume of

144. See, e.g., Burdon, et al., Mandatory Notification ofData Breaches, supra note 5, at
127 (regarding the reluctance of Australian and EU legislators to fully enmesh data breach
notification within existing legal frameworks).
145.

See AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 1693 (Specifying

personal information under the proposal, "should draw on the existing definitions of 'personal
information' and 'sensitive information' in the Privacy Act and should prescribe what
combinations of these types of information would, when acquired without authorization, give
rise to a real risk of serious harm requiring notification").
146. See Nigel Waters, et al., Intepreting the Security Principle (Cyberspace Law and
Policy Centre, University of New South Wales, Working Paper No. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.cyberlawcentre.org/ipp/wp/WPI%2OSecurity.pdf.
147. Id. at 34-35.
148. See Needles, supranote 74, at 277.
149. Id. at 283.
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incidents and the number of persons affected. Accordingly, data
breach notification is either a comprehensive facet to a sectoral
approach or a sectoral adjunct to a comprehensive regime.so These
differences in application are manifested in the scope of protections
provided in sectoral and comprehensive regimes which place different
priorities relating to the provision of individual protections and the
minimization of corporate compliance costs.
B. Market-BasedInitiatives Versus Rights-BasedProtections
The manifestations of sectoral and comprehensive approaches
highlight differences between both laws as they place alternate
priorities about the role of organizational compliance cost mitigation.
Data breach notification laws tend to adopt market-based remedies
that are conscious of the compliance requirements of data collecting
organizations whereas those information privacy regimes that adopt
data breach notification laws tend to focus more on the preservation
of individual protections. The development of encryption safe harbors
for data breach notification in the US and other jurisdictions is
relevant in this regard.
The use of an encryption safe harbor has been an integral
element of data breach notification laws because legislators use
encryption to define notification parameters for organizations. As
applied in most data breach notification laws, encrypted personal
information does not trigger an obligation to notify because the
information that has been acquired without authorization is secure,
and therefore does not pose an identity theft risk.151 In a review of
2007 US developments, Jones identified three types of encryption
safe harbors. 152 Exemptions exempt notification based on the notion
that encrypted data is secure and does not pose a risk.153 Rebuttable
presumptions create a presumption that encrypted data is secure and
unauthorized acquisitions do not have to be notified.154 However, this
presumption can be rebutted by facts to the contrary. Factor-based
analysis requires breached organizations to demonstrate that the
encryption adopted was effective before notification is exempted."5
150. See, e.g., id. at 303 (regarding the application of data breach notification in US and
other jurisdictions).
151.
Id. at 278-79.
152. Michael Jones, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private
Sector, 3 ISJLP 555, 573 (2007).
153. Id. at 565.
154. Id. at 573.
155.

BURDON, ET AL., VIABILITY, supra note 104.
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The use of these different types of safe harbors reveals underlying
contestations that take place in sectoral and comprehensive regimes
regarding the use of encrypted personal information as a means to
minimize corporate compliance costs. Recent research shows that the
use of exemptions and rebuttable presumptions are favored by the
sectoral approach of the US while factor-based analysis is favored in
comprehensive regimes such as the EU and Australia.156
At the US state legislature level, the use of encryption
exemptions is directly linked to corporate compliance cost reduction
and the development of market incentives to enhance corporate
information security measures. For example, the controversial
encryption exemption adopted in the California law appears to have
been developed as a means of reducing corporate fears relating to
compliance costs and to ensure that the law was compliant with
related federal legislation and regulation. 57 The legislative intent of
the California encryption exemption was thus a relatively simple
solution to the complex balancing act of enhancing information
security practices, while at the same time, minimizing compliance
burdens. Similar outcomes are also evident in other states. Following
the implementation of Indiana's initial data breach notification law in
2006, a second data breach notification bill was introduced in 2008158
that sought to alter the statute's definition of encryption. The
provisions of the second bill would have had the effect of
benchmarking adopted encryption processes and technologies to
ensure they meet existing industry best practices, including the move
away from password protection to encryption. However, the vast
majority of the bill was rejected following intensive lobbying by
major corporations who feared an increase in compliance
requirements. 19
The development of the Massachusetts encryption exemption has

156. See generally Burdon et al., Encryption Safe Harbors, supranote 72.
157. PersonalInformation Privacy: Hearing on SB1386 Before the Assembly Committee
on Buisness and Professions, (need leg. session info) (2002) (statement by Lou Correa,
Chairman, Assembly Committee on Business and Professions) ("[I]n practice, this bill will
create incentives for organizations seeking to simplify their legal requirements to encrypt their
personal information data and develop privacy policies with similar notification procedures.").
158. H.B. 1197, 2008 115th Gen. Assemb., Second Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008) (sought
additions to the existing encryption definition that would require adopted encryption processes
to be "consistent with best practices common in the industry" including the security
management arrangements of the encryption key).
159. See Chris Soghoian, At&T, Microsoft Win as ID Theft Bill Eviscorated, CNET NEWS,
February 13, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-9870992-46.html (regarding the
contentious discussions involved in the development of the second bill).
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also been fraught with contention. The Massachusetts definition of
encryption is unique' 60 and has been the subject to much controversy
particularly relating to the use of further regulations developed by the
Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation (OCABR). The
first version of the OCABR regulations was released in early 2008 to
voluble criticism from private sector organizations regarding potential
compliance requirements. 16 ' The criticism was such that a public
hearing was held and a further senate bill (SB 173) was put forward to
revise the encryption requirements of the OCABR regulations. 162
Senate Chairman Morrissey introduced SB173, stating at the hearing
that the regulations went "beyond its intent"1 63 in relation to technical
requirements and other factors. Moreover, SB173 removed the
specific requirement for a type of encryption and stated that a
specified form of encryption was not to be applied.'6 The primary
reason for the removal of the specified encryption exemption was to
protect small and medium size businesses as specified by section one
of SB173.1 65 In February 2009, OCABR released amended
160. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, §1 (2007). (The full definition of encryption reads:
encryption "is the transformation of data through the use of a 128-bit or higher algorithmic
process into a form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a
confidential process or key, unless further defined by regulation of the department of consumer
affairs and business regulation." It is the second element of the definition, in conjunction with
the 128 bit requirement that has led to controversy).
161. See Mark E. Schreiber & Robert G. Young, Aggressive New Massachusetts Data
Breach Law and Proposed Security Rules Require Company Action, 3 PRIVACY & DATA
SECURITY L.J. 140, 144 (2008), available at http://www.eapdlaw.com/files/News/4322f87fa398-4342-8cOb-33c977a22c54/Presentation/NewsAttachmentleb517cbf-4b50-4d70-a250399e9596f7da/aggressive%20new/ 20massachusetts%20data%201aw.pdf (regarding private
sector concerns); see also Anne Doherty Johnson, AeA Update: Massachusetts Data Breach
2008,
Nov.
17,
COUNCIL,
NEW
ENGLAND
AEA
Regulations,
http://www.aeanet.org/AeACouncils/zpUnYyihJjBdaJkdVzilPsEPkNrmnYWy.pdf (particularly
in relation to technical issues such as the definition of encryption, the requirement to encrypt
personal information and the requirement to encrypt information transmitted wirelessly).
162. See Alexander B. Howard, Mass. Senate Seeks to Amend, Weaken Data Breach
2009,
May
14,
COMPLIANCE,
SEARCH
Law,
Notification
http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid 195_gci 1356356,00.html#
(regarding the claim that the Massachusetts Legislature had the power to change 93(H) but not
the regulations). See also Jason Lefferts, Office of Consumer Affairs Files Revised ID Theft
Regulations, OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS REGULATION, Feb. 12, 2009,

http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD=ocapressrelease&L=1 &LO=Home&sid=Eoca&b-pressrelease&f
=20090212_idtheft&csid=Eoca (regarding the regulatory change of approach).
163. See Alexander B. Howard, Mass. Senate Seeks to Amend, Weaken Data Breach
2009,
May
14,
COMPLIANCE,
SEARCH
Law,
Notification
http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid 195_gci 1356356,00.html#.
164. Id.
available at
Court (Mass. 2009),
186th General
See S.B.
173,
165.
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/senate/186/st00pdf/st00173.pdf. SI(A), SB173 (stating "The
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regulations and the definition of encryption was changed. 16 6 At
present, SB173 has not been enacted but the new regulations have
now come into force.167
At the US federal level, the two bills that have passed a vote in
Congress contain rebuttable presumptions rather than exemptions.
However, the use of rebuttable presumptions still indicates a desire to
reduce corporate compliance obligations. Testimony heard by the
House of Representative Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and
Consumer Protection, in relation to the DATA 2009 bill is clear on
this point. The threat of over-regulation was clearly articulated in line
with the adoption of a risk-based approach that focused on the
implementation of reasonable and appropriate security measures
rather than specific technologies.168 A similar point is echoed by
California Senator Diane Feinstein regarding her efforts to introduce a
number of data breach notification bills including the Notification of
Risk to Personal Data Act of 2005. Senator Feinstein did not believe
an encryption exemption was warranted because "[c]onsumers must
have the tools they need to protect themselves against the risk of
identity theft"l69 even though it was against the interests of the

department shall not in its regulations, however, require covered persons to use a specific
technology or technologies, or a specific method or methods for protecting personal
information.").
OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS REGULATION, 201 CMR 17.00:
166.
STANDARDS FOR THE PRTOECTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION OF RESIDENTS OF THE

COMMONWEALTH, http://www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs/idtheft/201CMR1700reg.pdf (last visited
Sept. 7, 2010) ("the transformation of data into a form in which meaning cannot be assigned
without the use of a confidential process or key").
167. Id. (regarding the new regulations).
168. See Testimony ofRobert Holleyman: Hearingon H.R. 2221 "the Data Accountability
and Protection Act" and H.R. 1319 "Informed P2P User Act" Before the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade and Consumer ProtectionHouse Committee on Energy and Commerce, 11Ith
Cong. 5 (May 5, 2009) (statement of Robert Holleyman President and CEO of Business
Software Alliance) (regarding testimony provided by Robert Holleyman, the president of the
Business Software Alliance (BSA) and stating "The potential is high to turn data custody - an
activity that is for most companies, whether large or small, only incidental to their core business
- into a stifling compliance burden, with little to gain in terms of increased data security"). See
BSA
BSA
and
Members,
About
Software
Alliance,
also
Business
http://www.bsa.org/country/BSA%20and%20Members.aspx (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (stating
"BSA is the voice of the world's commercial software industry and its hardware partners on a
wide range of business and policy affairs").
169. Press Release, Senator Diane Feinstein, Press Release: Senator Feinstein Calls for
Passage of Legislation to Require Prompt Notification When Personal Information Has Been
Compromised by Data Breach (June 6, 2006) (on file with author), available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.PressReleases&ContentRe
cord id=7929faac-7e9c-9af9-71 f4-d3142e230015&Region id=&Issue id=5b8dcl 6b-7e9c9af9-7de7-22b24a491232).
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financial sector. 17 0 The bill did not succeed, but Senator Feinstein
clearly indicates corporate interests in the reduction of compliance
requirements related to data breach notification.
These examples highlight that the use of encryption safe harbors
in US data breach notification laws and proposals prioritize the
reduction of corporate compliance cost burdens by minimizing the
scope of notification. The encryption safe harbor has been an adjunct
to the primary aim of the laws, the mitigation of identity theft crimes,
and has been developed as a counterbalance to corporate fears of the
compliance implications of over-notification that potentially conflict
with the consumer protection aims of data breach notification laws.
Contrast that with similar discussion within the EU where
encryption safe harbors have also been a bone of contention but for
different reasons. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
issued an opinion on the proposed amendments to the e-Privacy
Directive and stated that the appropriate technological protection
measures exemption should not be implemented.17 ' The Working
Party feared that the enactment of an exemption would significantly
reduce the quality and usefulness of notifications delivered to affected
persons.172 In essence, the only way a person can take action to
protect themselves is if they have received adequate information
about the risk. The content of notification format is an essential
component of notification and organizational decisions to notify
should only be based on the principle of risk assessment rather than
exemptions based on technical measures to protect personal data.173
The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) voiced a similar
concern by broadly stating that Article 4 of the amended e-Privacy
Directive "should not contain any exception to the obligation to
notify".1 74 Instead, the issue of safe harbors to notification should be
170. Press Release, Senator Diane Feinstein, Press Release: Senator Feinstein Reiterates
Call for Passage of Strong ID Theft Legislation (June 7, 2006) (on file with the author),
at
available
http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.PressReleases&Con
tentRecord id=792a0134-7e9c-9af9-75ef-07abbb67d740&Region id=&Issue id=5b8dcl6b7e9c-9af9-7de7-22b24a491232).
171. See Opinion 1/2009 on the proposals amending Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and
electronic communications (e-Privacy Directive) at 6, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
(2009).
172. Id. at 6.
173. Id.
174. Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Directive
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending, among others, Directive 2002/58/EC
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) at 8 (2008).
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addressed through extensive debate relating to the issues at stake
which would be reflected in implementing legislation.17 5
Significant differences exist between sectoral and comprehensive
approaches regarding the choice of encryption safe harbors in data
breach notification laws. The use of encryption safe harbors
highlights the different prioritization between sectoral and
comprehensive approaches regarding conflicting interests of corporate
compliance and consumer protection.176 The use encryption safe
harbors again highlights the ex ante and an ex post purposes'77 that
are inherent to data breach notification. Comprehensive approaches
focus on the ex ante purpose through the encouraged adoption of
encryption and other technologies to protect personal information. 78
The sectoral approach, on the other hand, focuses on the ex post aim
that regards a greater importance to the minimization of compliance
cost burdens by not requiring notification for data breaches that
involve the unauthorized acquisition of encrypted personal
information. As such, the use of encryption safe harbors for data
breach notification purposes in comprehensive legal frameworks
encourage the use of encryption as a means to secure personal data
per se thus ensuring the protection of individual rights of control and
access to personal information. However, encryption safe harbors in
sectoral data breach notification laws use encryption as compliance
cost reduction measure and a market-based incentive for encouraged
adoption of information security procedures.179 These are two
different motivations for the use of encryption that reflect the
expansive scope of rights-based protections of information privacy
laws and the narrow approach of market-based initiatives found in
data breach notification laws. These fundamental differences explain
why the sectoral approach of data breach notification sits rather

175. Id. at 8.
176. See, e.g., Winn, supra note 76, at 1161 (regarding the development of the Californian
law, "Confronted with the complex, multi-polar institutional framework of business information
systems, the California legislature asserted jurisdiction over only two parties and crafted a bipolar solution that resembles the holding of a case more than it resembles modem regulation:
California citizens were given a right of notice of problems occurring at businesses serving
them.").
177. Romanosky & Acquisti, supra note 102, at 1061.
178. See, e.g., The Future of Privacy - Joint Contribution to the Consultation of the
European Commission on the Legal Framework for the Fundamental Right to Protection of
Personal Data at 15-16, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2009); Plain English
Guidelines to Information Privacy Principles 4-7 at 7, Office of the Privacy Commissioner
(Austri.) (1998).
179. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 118, at 239-40.

94

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 27

uncomfortably in comprehensive frameworks and the comprehensive
element of universal coverage generates such compliance cost-related
concerns.
IV. SHARED HORIZONTAL WEAKNESSES
Along with fundamental differences, both information privacy
and data breach notification laws share similar weaknesses which
come more clearly into focus when the conceptual reach of the
information covered by the laws is examined. Regulatory action under
both laws is derived under chains of accountability that seek to link
providers, collectors and users of personal information. Moreover,
both laws have an overt focus on the regulation of specific types of
information albeit from different conceptual and contextual
approaches. These shared weaknesses are illustrated within the
context of three major data breaches.
A. Three IllustrativeDataBreaches
Three data breaches are examined to demonstrate that individual
breaches have different causes and ramifications that require
alternative regulatory responses. The introduction of Bennett and
Raab's Fallibility Matrix reveals the different causes behind the three
breaches that involve both human and technological errors. However,
both data breach notification and information privacy laws have
restricted accountability frameworks which results in limited
remedies.
The first example involves the British National Party (BNP) and
the leaking of their membership list. The BNP is a right-wing,
nationalist political party based in the United Kingdom, and
membership of the party is a sensitive issue as some professions
preclude membership of the party. 180 In 2008, a disgruntled former
BNP employee obtained the BNP's membership list without
authorization and published the roughly 13,500 party membership list
on the Internet.18 1 The published details included names, addresses,
180. See ACPO Bans Police from Joining BNP, BBC NEWS, May 19, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/3930175.stm (regarding the Association of Chief Police
Officers (ACPO) ban on membership of the BNP in UK police forces); Christopher Hope, How
Many BNP activists Live in Your Town? Now You Can Find Out, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov.
2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/3484489/How-many-BNP20,
activists-live-in-your-town-Now-you-can-find-out.html.
181. See generally Ian Cobain, Esther Addley & Haroon Siddique, BNP Membership List
19,
2008,
Nov.
'Hardliner', GUARDIAN,
Former
by
Online
Posted
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/nov/19/bnp-list; BNP Activists' Details Published,
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telephone numbers, email addresses, and, in some cases, employment
details. The list also included the names and ages of children who
have become members of the party after a parent had taken out a
family membership, and several people who had joined the party at
the age of sixteen.18 2 The BNP subsequently admitted that the list was
inaccurate as it included the names of persons who had never been
party members. 183
Different organizations and individuals used bit torrent and
social networking websitesl 84 to copy and disseminate the
membership list further. Moreover, media organizations and
individuals used the membership list to create geo-mashups based on
its content. The unauthorized release of the BNP membership list had
some serious consequences. Some BNP members lost their jobs... or
received death threats 1 6 and in one instance, a car belonging to the
BBC NEWS, May 19, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7736405.stm; Dominic Kennedy & Nico
Hines, Thousands in Fear after BNP Members List Leak, THE TIMES, Nov. 19 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5183833.ece; James Kirkup & Christopher
Hope, BNP Membership List Leaked onto Internet, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 19 2008,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/3479612/BNP-membership-list-leakedonto-intemet.html; Ben Russell, BNP Membership List Published on Internet, THE
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 19 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/bnp-membershiplist-published-on-intemet-1024719.html; James Sturcke, et al., BNP Membership List Leaked
Online, GUARDIAN, Nov. 18, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/nov/18/bnpmembership-list-leak.
182. See Cobain, Addley & Siddique, supra note 181.
183. See Sturcke, et al., supra note 181 (reporting that data collected and published on the
list was of a rather unconventional nature).
184. See Sam Leith, Comments, What's 'Liberal' About Hacking into the BNP?, DAILY
available
at
at
30,
22,
2008,
Nov.
TELEGRAPH
(London),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/samleith/3563694/Whats-liberal-abouthacking-into-the-BNP.html (regarding publication of personal information from the BNP
membership list on Facebook).
185. See 'BNP Membership' Officer Sacked, BBC NEWS, March 21, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk-news/england/merseyside/7956824.stm (regarding the
sacking of a police officer for being a member of the BNP); Radio Host Exposed in BNP Leak is
Axed,
LONDON
EVENING
STANDARD,
Nov.
19,
2008,
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23589438-radio-host-exposed-in-bnp-leak-isaxed.do (regarding the sacking of a national talk back radio presenter); Church Asked to Ban
BNP Members, BBC NEWS, Jan. 19, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/7838280.stm
(highlighting the fact that the Church of England Synod is considering banning clergy from
joining the BNP after it was revealed that clergymen were members of the BNP).
186. See BNP Members 'Targeted by Threats,' BBC NEWS, Nov. 19, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk-news/politics/7736794.stm (regarding details of threats
received by callers to a BBC radio programme); Ian Watson, Privacy Issues for BNP Members,
BBC NEWS, Nov. 19, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk-news/politics/7737651.stm
(regarding the security of BNP members in Northem Ireland and the Irish Republic); lain
Robinson, Death Threats Follow BNP List, THE SENTINEL, Nov. 20, 2008, at 11, available at
http://www.thisisstaffordshire.co.uk/news/Death-threats-follow-BNP-list/article-488115-
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neighbor of a BNP member was mistakenly petrol bombed. 187 Media
sources reported that two persons were arrested and prosecuted with
criminal offences under the Data Protection Act 1998, in a joint
investigation with the Information Commissioner's Office, regarding
the publication of the list.'8 1
The second example involves the pharmaceutical corporation
Pfizer. In 2007, the spouse of a Pfizer employee accessed his
partner's work-related laptop by using the employee's username and
password.18 9 After he had gained access, the spouse installed an
unauthorized software program which enabled access to a peer-topeer file sharing network.' 90 The installation of the software was done
without the knowledge or consent of the corporation and was against
Pfizer's employee policies.' 9' The laptop held details of 17,000 Pfizer
employees and the unauthorized software was configured in such a
way that other members of the peer-to-peer network were able to
access files containing Pfizer employee details.' 92 Pfizer was able to
determine that the personal information of 15,700 Pfizer employees
had been accessed or copied by unknown members of the peer-to-peer
network.193 Pfizer was also asked a number of critical questions by
the Attorney General of Connecticut, Richard Blumenthal regarding
Pfizer's knowledge of the data breach and the delay in notification to

detail/article.html (regarding death threats received by a BNP local councilor); Death Threats as
BNP Members are Named, CORNISH GUARDIAN, Nov. 26, 2008, at 22, available at
http://www.thisiscomwall.co.uk/news/Death-threats-BNP-members-named/article-499803detail/article.html (regarding death threats to Cornish BNP members).
187. Police Probe BNP Link to Car Fire, BBC NEWs, Nov. 21, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk-news/england/bradford/774127O.stm; Nico Hines, BNP
Member Says Family Safety at Risk After Car Explodes Outside Home, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 21,
2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5204727.ece.
188. Two Arrests over Leaked BNP List, BBC NEwS, Dec. 5, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk-news/england/nottinghamshire/7768142.stm; BNP List
Arrest Pair are Bailed, BBC NEWS, Dec. 10, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//2/hi/uk news/england/nottinghamshire/7775631.stm; Ian Johnston, Two Held over BNP
6,
2008,
Dec.
INDEPENDENT,
Leak,
THE
Member
List
http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid-OTgINDg4Mg.
189. Jaikumar Vijayan, Pfizer Waited Six Weeks to Disclose Data Breach, INFOWORLD,
July 18, 2007, http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/pfizer-waitedsix-weeks-disclosedata-breach-268.
190. Martin H. Bosworth, PfizerKeeps DataBreach Quiet, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, July
17, 2007, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/07/pfizer data.html.
191.
Pfizer, FAQs Related
to Pfizer Data Breach: Introduction (2007),
http://www.pfizer.com/contact/pfizer data breach introduction.jsp (last visited Sept. 10, 2010).
192. Vijayan, supra note 189; John Leyden, Pfizer Worker Data Leaked via P2P, THE
REGISTER, June 14, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/14/pfizerp2p dataleak/.
193. Vijayan, supranote 189.
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its employees.1 9 4 Pfizer replied in depth about the circumstances of
the breach but offered no indication as to the reason for the delay in
notification. 195
The final example regards one of the most important and
influential data breaches, the ChoicePoint incident. ChoicePoint was a
data collection and storage company that held information on USA
households and persons totaling nineteen billion records on US
citizens.196 ChoicePoint provided access to its databases for legitimate
businesses for a subscription fee. At the time of the breach,
ChoicePoint had 50,000 subscribing companies that included
insurance agencies, banks, landlords and private detectives.' 9 7 I
February 2005, criminals posing as a small business applied to
ChoicePoint for subscription to their information services. Once the
criminals subscribed to ChoicePoint's information services, they were
allowed to acquire the personal information of 163,000 persons
including date of birth, social security numbers, and credit reports to
be used for identity theft crimes.
The application forms necessary to access ChoicePoint's data
were completed using false information which the company failed to
realize because it had not implemented procedures that confirmed and
authorized the identities of potential subscribers.'9 ChoicePoint later
admitted that fifty business clients to whom it was selling data were
fraudulent entities.'" ChoicePoint simply did not have processes in
place to identify and monitor unlawful users despite the fact that they
had been previously notified by law enforcement authorities of

194. Letter from Richard Blumenthal to Bernard Nash, Esq., Dickstein Shapiro LLP, re
Pfizer Security Breach (June 6, 2007) (on file with the State of Connecticut),
http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/consumers/pfizerdatabreachletter.pdf.
195. Vijayan, supranote 189.
196. See Choicepoint, EPIC.ORG (Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington
D.C.), http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (regarding the role of
ChoicePoint as a data broker); Garcia, supra note 82, at 716 (stating that ChoicePoint collected
personal information of consumers, "including names, social security numbers, dates of birth,
bank and credit card account numbers, and credit histories, much of which is sensitive and not
publicly available").
197. See, e.g., Derek A. Bishop, To Serve and Protect: Do Businesses Have a Legal Duty
to Protect Collections of PersonalInformation?, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 7 (2006)
(regarding class actions against ChoicePoint); see generally Martin G. Bingisser, Data Privacy
and Breach Reporting: Compliance with Varying State Laws, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 9
(2008) (regarding the actions of state attorney general's).
198. See P. N. Otto, et al., The ChoicePoint Dilemma: How Data Brokers Should Handle
the Privacy of PersonalInformation, 5 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 15, 18. (2007) (providing a
detailed and critical overview of the incident).
199. See Garcia,supra note 82, at 716-17.
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fraudulent activities arising from some of their subscribers.20 0
ChoicePoint notified consumers of the incident pursuant to the
California law and were subsequently charged with offences relating
to the failure to provide adequate security and for making false and
misleading statements about its privacy policy. 20 1 In total, eight
hundred incidents of identity theft have been attributed to the
ChoicePoint data breach.202 ChoicePoint agreed to pay $US10 million
in civil penalties and $US5 million in consumer redress to reimburse
consumers for expenses due to identity theft. 203
B. One Size Fits All Chains ofAccountability
The author contends that both laws have a shared weakness
because they are predicated on process-based chains of accountability
that seek to provide legislative remedies within the bounds of
designated roles involving providers, collectors and re-users of
personal information. However, limitations emerge due to the
simplistic nature of these chains, which no longer account for the
complexities of personal information exchange and because remedial
responses treat different concerns within the same constrained rubric
of the accountability framework. The limits of both laws are
illustrated when the three data breaches highlighted are examined in
greater depth using Bennett and Raab's fallibility matrix,204 which
underscores that different types of privacy problems are essentially
addressed in the same manner by both laws.
Bennett and Raab developed a simple four cell matrix to
examine the source of privacy problems that arise through human and
technological fallibilities and infallibilities.205 The authors use the
matrix to demonstrate that different types of privacy problems can
occur within different cells. For example, Cell I contains most privacy

200. United States of America (for the Federal Trade Commission) v. ChoicePoint Inc.,
FTC File No. 052-3069 p. 13, (Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil Penalties,
Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief, January 26, 2006), available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf.
201. See Samuel Lee, Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and Data
SafeguardingNow Apply to Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs.1 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L. J.
125, 130 (2006).
202. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach
Charges; To Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (2006),
availableat http://www.fic.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm.
203. Id. (outlining details of the settlement); see also Garcia,supra note 82, at 716.
204. BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 25 (regarding the
conceptual basis of the matrix).
205. Id
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problems as they involve both human and technological fallibilities
such as the excessive collection of personal information.206 Cell
details a different type of situation, namely, where there are no
technological or structural problems and the privacy problem occurs
due solely to the "workings of human agency." 2 07 Cell III covers
opposite situations to Cell II where a technological or structural issue,
rather than a case of human error, gives rise to privacy problems, such
as a deficient data processing system or a malicious hacking attack.208
Finally, Cell IV refers to situations in which both human agents and
technological structures perform adequately but this level of
performance creates surveillance-related concerns. 2 09 The last cell is
of less concern to this article as the focus on data breaches naturally
requires an examination of personal information leakage. However,
the remaining three cells are instructive because they highlight that
data breaches and therefore information privacy problems arise in
different contexts, as outlined in Figure 2 below.
Bennett and Raab also contend that each fallibility axis is a
continuum and thus the positioning of privacy problems can be
related to any part of each cell. 21 0 However, in practice, it is likely
that most positions will be found nearer the meeting point of the axes
rather than the corners of each cell because "few human agents, and
few technical systems, are either perfect or imperfect." 2 11 The three
example breaches show that, even though each breach can be
separated into different cells, they nonetheless share overlapping
features that make each breach relatively similar. For example, it
could be argued that all data breaches involved issues of ineffective
security which would tend to suggest a technological or structural
failing. It is not surprising to find that each breach locates towards the
center of the matrix rather than the periphery. Nevertheless, each data
breach highlights that information privacy problems originate in
different ways.

206. Id. at 26-27.
207. Id. (citing examples such as "wrong inferences or conclusions from outputs of data
produced by the system, whether because of inadequate training, the biases inherent in the
pursuit of certain organizational goals, the pressures of reward systems in the organization").
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 26.
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Fig. 2 - Application of Illustrative Data Breaches to Bennett and
Raab's Fallibility Matrix
Cell Ill

Technological Fallibility

Cell I

BNP

ChoicePoint

Human Infallibility

Human Fallibility

Pfizer

Cell II

Technological Infallibility

Cell IV

The BNP data breach can be located in Cell I because it entails
both technological and human failings. First, human infallibilities
arose because unnecessary and inaccurate personal information was
collected from BNP members and even non-BNP members. Second,
technological and structural fallibilities occurred because the
disgruntled employee was able to easily acquire and copy the
complete membership list without authorization and remove it from
the confines of the BNP's organizational structure. The Pfizer data
breach, on the other hand, gives rise to a different problem, which
locates it in Cell II of Bennett and Raab's matrix. The initial data
breach arose because the employee's spouse installed unauthorized
software which enabled unknown third parties to access and acquire
employee personal information without authorization. Accordingly,
there was no technological or structural fallibility, and the problem
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originated solely from the actions of the employee's spouse who was
able to bypass technological protections. The ChoicePoint data breach
is an example of a Cell III type privacy concern as it originated from a
structural and technological problem rather than human fallibility. In
this case, it was ChoicePoint's procedures which were at fault. In fact,
if ChoicePoint had completed a background check on the criminals, it
would have found a link between one of the applicants and previous
frauds involving social security numbers according to its own
records.2 12
The application of Bennett and Raab's matrix to these three data
breaches is helpful because it demonstrates that data breaches, as
information privacy problems, emerge in different ways and contain
different contexts. For example, only one of the breaches, the
ChoicePoint incident, is directly related to identity theft issues. The
BNP data breach, while not giving rise to identity theft issues, clearly
gave rise to different forms of harm such as the petrol bombing attack
that took place. The Pfizer data breach did not materialize any actual
identity theft or other related harms but certainly had the potential to
do so.213 However, while the three data breaches have different
contexts, all of them involve the insertion of outside third parties that
are integral to the emergent privacy problems.
The BNP data breach occurred because of the disgruntled
employee's initial unauthorized acquisition but the real 'privacy
problem' was the subsequent re-use of the membership list and its
publication on the internet by third parties ulterior to the breach. The
Pfizer breach, like the BNP breach, demonstrates a layered, emergent
problem. The installation of the peer-to-peer software by the
employee's spouse gave rise to the initial privacy concern. However,
it is the second unauthorized acquisition by third parties unknown to
the breached organization that gave rise to the actual problem. The
ChoicePoint data breach is somewhat different in character to the
BNP and the Pfizer data breaches because there is less of an emergent
problem involving stages of unauthorized access. There was not an
initial unauthorized act that gave rise to a series of subsequent and

212. See United States of America (for the Federal Trade Commission) v. ChoicePoint
Inc., FTC File No. 052-3069 p. 13, (Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Civil Penalties,
Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief, January 26, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf.
213. Data Security Breach at Pfizer Affects Thousands, TechTarget, Sep. 5, 2007,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sidl4 gcil270736,00.html. See, e.g.,
Blumenthal, supra note 194) (regarding proposed actions for Pfizer to take to mitigate the
possibilities of identity theft).
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more serious unauthorized acts. Instead, the data breach was
mistakenly authorized by ChoicePoint due to the failings of its own
security systems. As such, only one act of unauthorized acquisition
took place that involved a different type of ulterior third party,
identity theft criminals.
These three incidents show that data breaches involve different
types of privacy problems. However, both information privacy and
data breach notification laws deal with those problems in a 'one-size
fits all' fashion founded upon narrow chains of accountability and
one-dimensional remedies that provide limited help or real redress.
For example, previous work has highlighted the limits of information
privacy law in dealing with the BNP data breach.2 14 The analysis of
this data breach within the rubric of investigating privacy invasive
geo-mashups highlighted the limits of information privacy law. The
principle reason being is that information privacy law is predicated on
predictable, binary chains of accountability between personal
information providers, collectors, and re-users. However, in this
incident the binary relationship between the data provider and the data
re-users (Wikileaks and the geo-mashup creators) does not
materialize, and thus there is no form of redress available against
these parties for individual BNP members whose personal
information has nonetheless been disclosed by them.
A similar concern arises with the Pfizer data breach where there
is no relationship at all between the provider of personal information
(Pfizer's employees) and the subsequent re-users (the peer-to-peer
members) other than a tangential link via the errant spouse. However,
it is clear that these re-users can give rise to serious potential threats
even though there is no direct relationship. Information privacy law
seems to operate more effectively with the ChoicePoint data breach
because this type of breach more readily accords with the imposition
of security protections for personal information within a readily
identifiable and largely institutionalized focus. 2 15 It is clearly arguable
that ChoicePoint failed to implement adequate security measures in
relation to the storage of personal information which is a key element
of most information privacy laws. 2 16 The outside third party in that
214. Burdon, First Generation Laws, supra note 17, at 35-38 (regarding
ineffectiveness of privacy protections in relation to publication on the internet).
215.

the

BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 35 (stating that

fundamental classifications under information privacy law are predicated on an institutionalized
basis).
216. See, e.g., BYGRAVE, supra note 58, at 67 (regarding the role of information security
as a key principle of information privacy laws).
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breach is therefore considered in information privacy laws as being a
reasonable eventuality unlike the third parties in the other two data
breaches.
Accordingly, the application of information privacy laws makes
it difficult to cope with the insertion of most third parties into the
contextual mix of privacy problems even though the transition from
binary to multiple information relationships is now an everyday part
of life in the information society.217 Information privacy laws overtly
focus on the process of personal information exchange rather than the
relationships or social contexts involved in that process. 2 18 The law's
focus on process has the benefit of providing a manageable and
implementable set of fair information principles that can readily
translate to a regulatory mechanism but it relegates the protection of
privacy to limited circumstances and thus greatly reduces the
potential scope for legal redress or remedial action. The inherently
reductionist scope of information privacy law 219 has created the
situation in which even legislative rights granted through the law are
nonetheless limited because they are based on mechanistic processes
of personal information exchange.2 20
Data breach notification laws, on the other hand, have been
developed to tackle a specific substantive issue regarding the
mitigation of identity theft risks arising from specified misuses of
personal information. In effect, they are less concerned about the
process of information exchange and pay lesser heed to regulating the
activities of personal information collectors and re-users by giving
personal information providers a set of limited rights. Accordingly,
data breach notification laws do not suffer from the same sort of
difficulties pertaining to chains of accountability due to their limited
focus. If an organization loses control over an individual's personal
information, then they have to notify that individual. 22 1 If a chain of
217. Burdon, First GenerationLaws, supra note 17, at 36.
218. See, e.g., BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supranote 20, at 35 (stating
that after 30 years of information privacy law there is still very little known about the needs or
requirements of 'data subjects').
219. See David Lindsay, An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the
Implicationsfor the Future of Australian Privacy Law, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 131, 165 (2005)
(regarding the role of excessive rationalization to minimize the scope of information privacy
law).
220. BENNETT & R-AAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 147 (stating
"[information privacy] laws have typically provided procedural rules and devices without
greatly tackling many substantive issues concerning the processing of personal data in
contemporary society").
Commission,
Trade
Federal
Data
Breach,
a
with
221. Dealing
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accountability exists, it is a rudimentary one between an organization
and an individual regarding the notification of unauthorized
acquisition of personal information. However, they do share the same
weakness as information privacy laws because they provide a one size
fits all remedy.222
The three data breaches illustrated in this section emit different
types of problems, demonstrate different types of causes and involve
different types of parties who have different motives. Despite these
differences, the only remedial response available is notification of the
incident. Schwartz and Janger have highlighted a number of criticisms
of this remedial aspect of data breach notification laws.22 3
Notification letters are problematic due to the context in which they
are used. For example, ChoicePoint's notification letters attempted to
minimize the extent of the breach and were concerned with damage
control to the company rather than the provision of accurate and
meaningful information to individuals.224 ChoicePoint was also
singled out for significant criticism as their notification letter
attempted to sell the company's credit reference products to those
persons who were being notified.225 Notification fatigue may also be a
prominent concern as individuals appear to treat notification letters as
another form of marketing material and do not read them.226
Notification may therefore provide a limited remedy.
A greater focus is needed on the context of each individual
breach and the remedies appropriate for that breach. For example, in
the BNP breach,227 it is questionable whether notification of the
breach would have made any difference given the public nature of the
membership lists re-publication. Instead, removal of the published
information was required although this would have been practically

http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/business/data-breach.html (last visited Sept. 14,
2010). See, e.g., St. Amant, supra note 81, at 511 (stating that the Californian law does not
require an actual breach or an identity theft element to oblige notification).
222. See, e.g., Bill Lane, et al., Stakeholder Perspectives Regarding the Mandatory
Notification ofAustralian Data Breaches, 15 M.A.L.R 149, 164 (2010) (presenting findings of
Australian research that questions the effectiveness of remedies provided by data breach
notification laws).
223. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86, at 952.
224. Id
225. Id. at 953.
226.

See PONEMON

INSTITUTE, NATIONAL

SURVEY

ON DATA

SECURITY BREACH

NOTIFICATION (2005) (regarding a survey of individuals who received notification letters and
their subsequent response to those letters).
227. It is of course acknowledged that the breach was not required to be notified under UK
law.
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very difficult given the extent the list was copied and re-used.
Accordingly, as Schwartz and Janger highlight, a more emphasized
focus on coordinated responses to data breaches is required that goes
beyond simple and blunt notification strategies. 228 However, to do so
would require a deeper contextual analysis that is conducted on a
case-by-case basis. This contextual analysis may be difficult to
implement from a regulatory perspective given the limited role that
data breach notification is intended to fulfill because both data breach
notification and information privacy laws have an overt focus on the
regulation of information which manifests in the mitigation of limited
social harms.
C. Information Based Focus and Limited Harms
Both data breach notification laws and information privacy laws
are designed to regulate certain types of information. However, there
are differences with regard to the inclusion or exclusion of context
based approaches. Information privacy has a wider outlook that
generally builds on context dependency and is flexible about what
information will be regulated. 2 2 9 However, while data breach
notification laws also regulate certain types of information they do so
from a context independent approach that seeks to negate the
application of context-based analysis. 2 30 The reason that both laws use
different types of information based regulation mechanisms is due to
their different purposes as highlighted above. Data breach notification
laws regulate a specific type of information to mitigate a specific
problem whereas information privacy laws regulate a wider type of
information for a potentially wider purpose. As such, both laws
regulate specified types of information to preclude certain harms, but
the harms that they seek to preclude are relatively limited as
demonstrated below.
Information privacy laws cover personally identifiable
information that is generally classified as "personal data" 23 1 or
"personal information." 2 32 The broad purpose of information privacy
228.
Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86, at 960.
229. See, e.g., Prins,supra note 39, at 247-49 (regarding the difficulties in assigning what
is personal information under data protection laws within the broad rubric of economic notions
of privacy as property).
230. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86, at 926-27. See Needles, supra note 15, at 281
(regarding the purpose of data breach notification as "the loss of control over a particular type of
data which can cause a "measurable economic harm" in the form of identity theft).
231. Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).
232. S6(1) PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) (Austrl.)
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laws is reflected in how personal information is classified. A key
component of information privacy law is that personal information
will be construed expansively, 233 and thus the classification of
personal information is potentially a complex task. The complexity
generates from the tacit acceptance of the need for context dependent
approaches in classifying personal information that go beyond the
information itself and require an examination of the social context of
information generation.2 34 For example, the definition of personal
information in the Australian Privacy Act has two distinct
elements. 2 35 The first element states that personal information is
information that makes an identity apparent, and the second element
is information from which an identity is reasonably ascertainable.2 36
The first element is a context-independent approach because there is
no recourse to the context of information generation because the
information itself is enough to enable identity. However, the second
element offers a different approach. It allows for the situation in
which information can be combined with other information to enable
identity. Accordingly, the second element relies heavily on social
context and this is seen as an integral element of Australian privacy
law.237
The issue of harm negation is a key element in the use of context
dependent approaches to the classification of personal information.
Harm in the eyes of the Australian law is the revealment of
identity. 238 Accordingly, the law takes an open approach to what
233.

See, e.g., ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 4/2007 ON THE

CONCEPT OF PERSONAL DATA. (2007) (confirming that a "wide notion" of personal data is to be
applied).
234. See, e.g., BOOTH, supra note 138 (providing models of how data protection
authorities conceptualize personal information both from a context independent and dependent
approach); Burdon & Telford, Conceptual Basis, supra note 138 (applying the models put
forward by the Booth Report to Australian legislation); WACKS, supra note 24, at 20 (regarding
the normative and descriptive role of personal information).
235. S6(1) PRIVACY ACT 1988 (Cth) (Austrl.) ("[P]ersonal information means information
or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a database), whether true or
not, and whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is
apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.").
236. Id. See Burdon & Telford, Conceptual Basis, supra note 138, at 12 (describing both
elements within the context of Australian privacy law).
237. See KAREN CURTIS, Speech to the Australian Corporate Lawyers Association on
at
2009),
(29
February
Canberra,
Line,'
the
and
'Walking
Privacy
http://www.privacy.gov.au/materials/types/download/9473/7038 ("This idea of what can be
'reasonably ascertained' is significant. Clearly, whether an individual's identity can be
ascertained depends on the context in which the information is held.").
238. See Burdon & Telford, Conceptual Basis, supra note 138, at 17-20 (regarding a
review of Australian legislation and confirming the centrality of identity revealment in
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constitutes personal information because the harm and the use of such
information are directly linked. However, it is acknowledged that not
all information privacy laws have an identity-related focus and some
laws require a type of privacy-related harm, above and beyond, the
revealment of identity. 239
Data breach notification laws attempt to mitigate the specific
harm of identity theft and they do so by regulating specified forms of
personal information in combination with other information. For
example, although the California law requires notification upon the
unauthorized acquisition of personal information, the definition of
personal information is different to those found in most
comprehensive information privacy laws because it seeks to negate a
context dependent analysis. As such, personal information under the
California law is
[A]n individual's first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following data elements,
when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted: (1)
Social security number. (2) Driver's license number or California
Identification Card number. (3) Account number, credit or debit
card number, in combination with any required security code,
access code, or password that would permit access to an
individual's financial account.240
The California law is therefore solely concerned with
combinations of personal information that can be used to give rise to
identity theft harms. Some US state-based laws have attempted to
expand definitions to include other identifying information, for
24124
passport number24 2 and account
example, biometric information,
passwords or other access codes.243 The North Carolina law has one
of the most expansive definitions relating to "identifying information"
that also includes digital signatures, parents' former legal surname 244
Australian privacy law).
239. See, e.g., BOOTH, supra note 138, at 95-102 (regarding different conceptualizations of
harm).
240. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(E). See also Bingisser, supra note 198 (regarding an
overview of differences).
241. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-801(5)(e) (2006).
242. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2006) (5)(B)(4); OR. REV. STAT. §
646A.600 (2007).
243. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3851
(2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911 (2005); IOWA CODE § 715C.1 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
75-60 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 10, §§ 210-B-1346 (West 2007); 9 VT. STAT. ANN. §§
2430 (2007).
244. See also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 (2005).
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and email addresses, amongst others. 24 5 The Texas law recognizes
both "personally identifying information" 2 46 and "sensitive personal
information."247 The former can be information that does not require
cross-referencing with other information to trigger notification of a
data breach whereas the latter requires the combination of personal
information and other identifying details. Likewise, the New York
law incorporates both "personal information" 248 and "private
information" 24 9 and the latter is the type of information normally
covered by data breach notification laws. The purpose of the different
definitions in the New York law is to clearly identify what will be
viewed as personal information for combination with private
information to create a specified sub-set of regulable information. As
such, all of these laws specify the types of information or
combinations of information that when breached could give rise to an
obligation to notify. What constitutes personal information within the
rubric of data breach notification is therefore deliberately
constrained.250
Data breach notification proposals that have been put forward in
comprehensive information privacy laws also have a context
independent approach as to what information will trigger notification.
For example, the data breach notification proposal put forward by the
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) uses a new form of
information called "specified personal information" that is designed
to limit the broad ranging definition of personal information in the
Privacy Act for data breach notification purposes. Specified personal
information prescribes combinations of information that would,
"when acquired without authorization, give rise to a real risk of
serious harm requiring notification."251 According to the ALRC, such

245. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-60 (2005).
246. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE § 48.002(1) (2008).
247. Id. at § 48.002(2).
248. N.Y. GEN. Bus LAWS §§ 899-aa (2005) §I(a) ("Personal information" shall mean any
information concerning a natural person which, because of name, number, personal mark, or
other identifier, can be used to identify such natural person").
249. Id. at §1(b) ("Private information" shall mean personal information consisting of any
information in combination with any one or more of the following data elements, when either
the personal information or the data element is not encrypted, or encrypted with an encryption
key that has also been acquired: (1) social security number; (2) driver's license number or nondriver identification card number; or (3) account number, credit or debit card number, in
combination with any required security code, access code, or password").
250. See St. Amant, supra note 81, at 526 (criticizing this approach and calling for flexible
definitions of personal information similar to comprehensive information privacy legal regimes).
251.

AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supranote 6, at 1693.
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information is likely to include an individual's name and address in
combination with other identifying information that could enable a
person to commit an "account takeover" or "true name fraud" while
recognizing that other harms can also arise.2 52 The ALRC's approach
to information that could oblige notification is in some respects
similar to that of US state-based data breach notification laws as it is
largely founded upon a context independent approach to classifying
sensitive personal information.
The EU has taken a different approach in the e-Privacy
Directive.253 The e-Privacy Directive differs substantially from the
purpose of US data breach notification laws as it has a much wider
ambit about the type of situations and the sort of information that will
trigger notification of a data breach.254 However, it is limited in the
sense as it only covers data breach incidents in the
telecommunications sector.25 ' The e-Privacy Directive simply states
that notification is required where there is a breach of network
security that lies beyond the provider to remedy. 256 The e-Privacy
Directive is potentially more expansive than its US data breach
legislative counterparts because it does not require a specified type of
information to trigger notification. The European Commission has
recently addressed this point by putting forward a new version of the
e-Privacy Directive which amends the existing security breach
notification requirements.2 57 A provider of a publicly available
electronic communications services will now have to notify a
competent national authority about a personal data breach. 258 The
definition of a personal data breach is "[a] breach of security leading
to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration,
252. Id. at 1694.
253. Council Directive 2002/58/EC.
254. See, e.g., Preston & Turner, supra note 64, at 463-64 (commenting on the "organic
development" of EU privacy legislation and the application of general data protection rules to
the telecommunications sector in the e-Privacy Directive).
255. Id.
256. Council Directive 2002/58/EC, Art. 20 ("Service providers should take appropriate
measures to safeguard the security of their services, if necessary in conjunction with the
provider of the network, and inform subscribers of any special risks of a breach of the security
of the network.").
257. See Commission Proposalfor a directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council amending Directives 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to
electronic communications networks and services and 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation, at 2 COM (2007) 698
[hereinafter UpdatedE-Privacy Directive](adopted at the GAERC Council of 26/10/2009).
258. Id. at 33.
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unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted,
stored or otherwise processed in connection with the provision of a
publicly available electronic communications service in the

Community." 2 59
The e-Privacy Directive now focuses mandatory data breach
notification on situations that (a) relate to personal data, (b) involve
specified unauthorized uses of personal data, and (c) personal data is
stored or processed in connection with a publicly available electronic
communications service.260 Nevertheless, the definition of a personal
data breach is still reliant upon the definition of personal data in the
Data Protection Directive. 2 6 1 The EU consequently differs from both
the US and the Australian approaches to data breach notification
because it does not include a specifically modified definition of
personal data (or information) for the purposes of data breach
notification. Moreover, the definition of personal data under Article
2(a) is to be construed expansively rather than prohibitively and
therefore has a fundamentally context dependent element. 262
A context independent approach can have some benefits because
it is possible to predict what information will constitute personal
information as it is pre-defined by regulatory authorities. 263 However,
an overt focus on types of information to stimulate regulatory activity
can produce anomalies because it forsakes a contextual analysis of
information generation. For example, some data breaches would not
be covered even though they could have significant ramifications.
This point is demonstrated by the BNP data breach.264 There is little
doubt that the BNP data breach should meet most of the requirements
for notification under a data breach notification law as there was an
unauthorized acquisition of personal information and there were
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Burdon, et al., Mandatory Notification ofData Breaches, supra note 5, at
127 (regarding the potentially problematic application of data breach notification in the
Directive).
261. See Council Directive 95/46, art 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) ('"[P]ersonal data' shall
mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.").
262.

See generally ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 4/2007,

supra note 233.
263. See BOOTH, supra note 138, at 12 (emphasizing that a "context independent"
approach facilitates consistency because it would not require analysis outside of the data at
issue).

264. BNP members 'targeted by threats,'
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/7736794.stm.

BBC

News,

Nov.

19,

2008,
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clearly harms and risks arising from the breach. However, under most
data breach notification laws, the breached organization would not
have to notify an individual about the breach because the type of
information that was breached would not necessarily trigger a
notification requirement.
In the BNP data breach, the type of personal information
breached did not entail personal information that would necessarily
enable identity theft, such as a credit card or bank account number.
Thus, under US state-based laws, there would not be a legal
requirement to notify because the BNP breached data would not meet
the determinant threshold required for publication, namely, that the
breached data gives rise to a risk of identity theft. The same is less so
with regard to the ALRC's proposal as it acknowledges that wider
harms to identity theft are applicable. However, and somewhat
perversely, under Australian information privacy law, the Internet is
construed as a generally available document and the Privacy Act
would not have applied because personal information published
would be construed as a generally available record and thus is exempt
from the Act.265
The BNP example shows the limits of an overt focus on the
types of personal information that is predicated on a context
independent approach which seeks to minimize the complexities of
social context as part of the fulfillment of legislative obligations. Data
breach notification laws, regardless of whether sectoral or
comprehensive based, have such a limited view of what constitutes
harm that they preclude a range of data breaches, like the BNP data
breach, even though material harms and risks arose to those persons
whose information had been accessed without authorization. This
highlights the weaknesses of analysis that is focused predominantly
265. The ALRC examined whether personal information held within a generally available
publication should be regulated under the Privacy Act. Currently, the Act only covers personal
information held in records and a generally available publication, such as most public registers
or telephone address books, are classed as a record so they are not covered within the auspices
of the Act. As regards publication of personal information on the Internet, the determining factor
to decide whether a publication is generally available online is "whether access to that
publication [e.g. a website] can be obtained by public." As such, a website that has encryption
and password protections is not considered generally available and therefore may be subject to
the Privacy Act, whereas a website without such protections is not subject to the Act because it
is a publication that can generally be obtained by the public. The ALRC contended that it was
not appropriate to enforce greater restrictions of the use of personal information on the Internet
by tightening regulation of personal information held in 'generally available publications', e.g.
websites. However, the ALRC stated that both organizations and agencies should be encouraged
to put restrictions on the publication of personal information in electronic form. See
AUSTRALIAN LAW & PRACTICE, supranote 6, at 462.
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on information and the process of information exchange and not the
context of which the information is used. 26 6 Even the e-Privacy
Directive, which has a more expansive, context dependent approach
to the classification of personal information, would encounter
problems with this data breach 26 7 due to the fact that the Directive
only covers organizations in the telecommunications sector 2 68 and
would therefore have not applied to the BNP.
Potential weaknesses of data breach notification law that is
founded on a sectoral approach can still exist when implemented
within comprehensive frameworks. The effect of a purely context
independent approach is to minimize the scope of data breach
notification either by developing restrictive forms of personal
information or by reducing the scope of coverage to particular
sectors.269 However, this minimization can reduce the effective
potential of data breach notification because it provides bounding
limits to the obligation to notify. The definition of personal
information in the Australian Privacy Act 2 70 demonstrates that a
context independent and dependent approach can work together but
that does not mean that the former can be imposed upon the latter
without any significant consequences. Data breach notification can
work in comprehensive information privacy frameworks, but it will
produce anomalies if it is implemented from a context independent
perspective. The complex issue of contextualization is thus
fundamental to the effectiveness of regulatory remedies in relation to
data breaches.
V. INTRODUCING CONTEXTUALIZATION

The above analysis highlights concerns relating to the underlying
approaches of both laws that seek to minimize the role of social
context. Consequently, the legislative requirements of both laws focus
upon restricted notions of harms, confined types of regulable
information and one size fits all conceptions of how problems emerge
and how they are to be remedied. However, the inclusion of a wider
contextual analysis into the application of both laws produces a
different perspective. First, it highlights that information privacy law
266. See, e.g., Solove, ConceptualizingPrivacy, supra note 34, at 1110 ("The theory's
focus on information, however, makes it too narrow a conception, for it excludes those aspects
of privacy that are not informational.").
267. UPDATED E-PRIVACY DIRECTIVE, supranote 258.
268. Id.
269. Burdon & Telford, ConceptualBasis, supra note 138.
270. Privacy Act, 1988, pt. I1, div. 3, 16B (Austl.).
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needs to pay greater heed to issues of privacy rather than issues of
personal information management. Second, it highlights that data
breach notification law should be considered as part of a wider
concern that relates to the societal use of critical information
infrastructures that entail the protection of personal information.
A. The Contextual Element
The social context of information generation and provision is a
latent but ever-present component of information privacy that is
directly or indirectly recognized by different laws. 271 For example,
Bennett and Raab contend that the content and provision of a privacy
right is inherently dependent on the context of social application and
is thus applied subjectively by individuals to their own
circumstances.2 72 Allen offers a different view of information privacy
and social context that is intimately bound with the creation,
development, and maintenance of social relationships. 2 73 privacy is
"down time" that provides the space for reflection and thus allows
individuals to prepare themselves for their wider social
responsibilities within the context of their own lives.274 Schoeman
also outlines that the wider concept of privacy is part of a "historically
conditioned, intricate normative matrix with interdependent practices"
and is best understood when viewed contextually. 27 5 Privacy as a
social practice thus shapes individual behavior in conjunction with
other social practices and is "central to social life." 2 76 Likewise, Moor
and Tavani also acknowledge the importance of "situations" in
deciding when an individual has a condition that is equivalent to
privacy.277 However, the notion of a situation is characterized as
"deliberately indeterminate or unspecified" so that it can be construed

271. See BOOTH, supra note 138, at 10-11 (highlighting a context dependent approach to
the identification of personal information is a key element of some information privacy laws).
272.

BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 9 ("But for the most

part, the content of privacy rights and interests have to be defined by individuals themselves
according to context.").
273. Anita L. Allen, CoercingPrivacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999).
274. Id. at 739-40 (The value of privacy therefore lies in "the context in which individuals
work to make themselves better equipped for their familial, professional, and political roles.");
See also FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN,

PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM (CAMBRIDGE

UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1992) (regarding the role of privacy in the balancing of social freedoms and
an individual's need to be part of a "human context").
SCHOEMAN, supranote 274, at 137.
275.
276. Id.
277. Moor, supra note 35, at 30 (stating privacy is normatively prevalent if an individual
or group is protected from intrusion, interference and access by others).
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in a number of different ways in circumstances that would normally
be regarded as private.2 78
One of the most recent and perhaps fullest accounts of the
importance of context in the regulation of information privacy is
Nissenbaum's Privacy in Context 279 which outlines and expands the
theory of Contextual Integrity. 280 Nissenbaum puts forward an
analytical framework to examine potential privacy concerns arising
from the introduction of new technologies or technological structures
principally involving the use of personal information. 281 Privacy is
sufficiently important to the continued existence of social and
political life that it cannot be compartmentalized and reduced in social
importance. 282 Instead, contextual integrity represents privacy as a
"delicate web of constraints," 283 relating to flows of personal
information that balance the multiple political and social spheres of
human life. An attack on individual privacy is therefore an attack at
the "very fabric of social and political life." 284 Privacy in this regard
is not a claim regarding an individual's control of their personal
information but rather entails a right to appropriate flow of personal
information which is systematically grounded in the characteristics of
social situations.285
Contextual Integrity is therefore based on social context and
gains expression through its primary concept, context-relative
informational norms. These norms govern entrenched expectations
that govern flows of personal information in everyday life.
Accordingly, a breach of privacy under the theory of Contextual
Integrity equates to a violation of an established informational
norm.286 These norms are characterized by the following four key
parameters.2 87 Contexts provide a backdrop for norm development
and feature an array of componentS 288 that abstractly represent the
278. Tavani, supra note 18, at 10 (explaining the role of Moor and Tavani's Restricted
Access/Limited Control (RALC) theory).
279.
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (Stanford Law Books 2010) [hereinafter NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN
CONTEXT].
280.

Helen Nissenbaum, Privacyas Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REv. 119 (2004).

281.

NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supranote 279, at 6-7.

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

128.

129.
140.
132 (defining the components as canonical "activities, roles, power structures,
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experienced social structures of everyday life. 2 89 Actors are those
participants involved in direct context of information exchange:
senders and receivers of information and information subjects.29 0
However, the types of relationship that each party has with each other
is not fixed and is acknowledged that both individuals and
organizational representatives can have different capacities in
different situational circumstances. 2 9 1 Attributes refer to the type or
nature of the information in question.292 For example, the same type
of information can have different meaning or application in different
contexts. 2 93 Finally, transmission principles provide a constraint on
the flow of information from party to party in a given context by
stipulating terms and conditions which govern the transfer of personal
*294
information.

These parameters are embedded within informational norms
which in turn are embedded within different social contexts.2 95 Flows
of information are intrinsic to human society and informational norms
regulate these flows within the context of socially expected
information uses and within socially specified situations. As such,
different parameters come to the fore in different social contexts and
in the guise of different privacy-related problems. For example, in a
context of information exchange amongst friends, there is expected
transmission principles, namely that the personal information
exchange is usually volunteered freely and there are certain trustbased expectations about how that information will or will not be
used. However, the medium of exchange can impact upon friendbased transmission principles especially in situations involving a
broader and thus less controlled transmission of personal
information.296 Likewise, the provision of the exact same personal
norms (or rules) and internal values (goals, ends, purposes)").
289. Id. at 134.
290. Id. at 141.
291. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY INCONTEXT, supra note 279, at 143. Nissenbaum contends
that an actor in one situation may not act in the same way as in another. For example, the
difference between an actor in a "businessman to employee" relationship compared to a "parent
to child" relationship. Accordingly, the capacity within which an actor may act has an
"innumerable number of possibilities."
292. Id at 144.
293. Id See, e.g., Burdon, et al., Encryption Safe Harbours,supra note 72 (contrasting the
different requirements for the loss of personal information involving different types of data
breach).
294.

NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supranote 279, at 145.

295. Id.
296. Id at 145-46 (describing the characteristics of friend-based transmission principles as
voluntary sharing of information, in combination with locally relative prohibitions on
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information is likely to vary between the context of a patient to doctor
relationship during a medical consultation compared to an
interviewee-interviewer relationship in relation to an employment
application. The analysis of informational norms and component
parameters are best conceived as juggling balls 29 7 that move in sync
with different emphases placed on different balls depending on the
social context involved and the privacy concern emanating.
The introduction of contextualization consequently adds a
sophisticated and multi-dimensional element to conceptualizations of
'privacy problems.' Nissenbaum developed the theory of Contextual
Integrity as a "framework for determining, detecting, or recognizing
when a [information privacy] (sic) violation has occurred."2 98 To do
so requires a comparison between entrenched and novel practices to
adduce whether there has been a violation of context-relative
informational norms.299 Privacy in Context is a valuable addition to
the literature in that regard as it cements the importance of
contextualization in the examination of concerns relating to the
provision, protection and use of personal information. However,
Nissenbaum acknowledges that much work has yet to be undertaken
about how Contextual Integrity can apply to existing information
privacy legal regimes, especially comprehensive frameworks.30 0
The purpose of introducing Nissenbaum's work into this article
is not to provide a framework for specifically assessing the
weaknesses of information privacy and data breach notification laws
but rather to reinforce the importance of applying social context to
laws that govern the protection of personal information. The
recognition that information privacy issues have a contextual element
is integral because it focuses greater attention to key foundation
stones, namely, social relationships, expectations of social and legal
norms, and the differing, subjective values of privacy that emanate in
different guises and in different social circumstances. Privacy
information use which thus provide confidential settings for sharing information between
friends). Accordingly, the provision of personal information directly between an individual and
other friends via email and one via open Facebook pages impacts upon the applicability of
friend-based transmission principles. The prospect of uncontrolled, wider distribution may in
itself act as a factor upon the release of information because there is less control over
transmission principles.
297.

NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supranote 279, at 145.

298. Id. at 148.
299. Id. at 148-49.
300. Id. at 238. Nissenbaum suggests that her theory of contextual integrity may be more
suited to sectoral frameworks because "it embodies informational norms relevant to specific
sectors, or contexts, in the law."
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regulation has many singular facets that involve diverse parties that
have dissimilar values relating to the protection of privacy, both at a
societal and individual level. The protection of personal information
is consequently an essentially contestable issue and is determined in
fluid rather than static environmental circumstances. Laws that
involve the protection of personal information need to be cognizant of
the wider social contexts involving the creation, exchange, and re-use
of personal information. However, as highlighted in this article, both
information privacy and data breach notification laws forsake a
context dependent approach and focus on deterministic modes of
regulation that overtly focus on specified types of information and
management processes. The final sub-sections of this article
incorporate ideas of contextualization to suggest new courses of
action.
B. More Privacy,Less Information
The introduction of a contextual analysis assists to highlight that
information privacy problems in relation to data breaches are not
simply related to a loss of control over personal information. Instead,
problems emerge from the breakdown of social relationships and
these relationships vary from context to context and data breach to
data breach. For example, the three illustrative data breaches
employed in this article show that information privacy problems
involve auxiliary third parties that are typically beyond the
accountability framework of information privacy law. The BNP data
breach 30 1 showed that the actual privacy problem was exacerbated by
the advent of geo-mashup creations that not only increased the
number of generative sources available but also provided a different
context on how the list was used.302 The Pfizer data breach303, on the
other hand, involved two third parties ulterior to the context of
personal information provision, storage, and use: the Pfizer
employee's spouse and the peer-to-peer users. Finally, the
ChoicePoint breach 3 04 involved identity theft-related criminals that
were able to acquire individual's personal information due to the
corporation's failure to provide adequate security.
The application of a contextual analysis, especially within the

301.
302.
303.
304.

See Burdon, FirstGenerationLaws, supra note 17, at 12.
See, e.g., id. at 37 (outlining the role of geo-mashup creation in the data breach).
See PFIZER, supra note 192.
See P.N. Otto, et al., supra note 199.
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framework of Bennett and Raab's infallibility matrix,305 demonstrates
that data breaches as information privacy problems are predicated
upon multiple rather than binary relationships and that the mechanics
of privacy-related problems arising from data breaches can manifest
outside the chain of accountability created by information privacy
law. Moreover, information privacy laws find it difficult to
acknowledge the importance of multiple relationships in regard to
data breaches because information privacy law is postulated on the
regulation of information management processes involving defined
parties. Accordingly, the issue is not about the length or strength of an
accountability chain between singular parties. Rather, the issue
regards how information privacy law attempts to identify and
reconcile situations that are deemed to be 'privacy problems.' It is this
deeming and reconciliation that is the ultimate limitation of
information privacy law because it is management processes rather
than social relationships that are deemed to be the problem.
Regulatory remedies therefore focus on the provision of limited rights
of control or access to that process as opposed to the provision of
remedies to actual privacy concerns. Thus, for example, a BNP
member has no redress against a geo-mashup creator and a Pfizer
employee is in the same position against a member of a peer-to-peer
network.
However, the ChoicePoint data breach provides a different
perspective as it involves an ever-present figure that is partially
recognized by the security principles of information privacy law-the
computer hacker or identity theft criminal. The security principles of
information privacy laws require organizations to maintain levels of
adequate security regarding the storage and transfer of personal
information.3 0 6 An individual who provided personal information to
an organization was reassured that their personal information would
be secured. Expectations are such now that, if an organization has a
database of personal information, that organization then must expect
an unauthorized attempt to access or acquire it. This is a new
information security reality in our information society. Including the
hacker/identity theft criminal as an ever-present third party within the
contextual situation of personal information exchange therefore
brings a third party into play that is separate to the accountability
framework of information privacy law. This hacker/identity theft

305.

See BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supranote 20, at 25-6.

306. See, e.g., BYGRAVE, supra note 58, at 68 (regarding the role of information security
principles in data protection laws).
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criminal is, at least, tangentially foreseeable. In turn, the enhanced
identification of third parties touches on a further significant benefit
of a contextual approach as it recognizes the possibilities for wider
informational harms and injustices than those currently envisaged by
information privacy laws.307
Nissenbaum incorporates van den Hoven's account of privacy
which provides four moral justifications for information privacy,
informational harms, information inequality, informational injustice,
and encroachment on moral autonomy, in order to prevent further
harms and thus promote equality, justice, and personal autonomy. 308
Informational harms acknowledge that a much greater span of harms
can arise from the unauthorized or illicit use of many types of
personal information in many different ways. 30 9 Harms consequently
do not simply involve identity theft-related issues but can cause fear
and anxiety to individuals which can lead to a withdrawal from social
life.310 Informational inequality recognizes that information
asymmetries exist between different parties and therefore social
benefits can be accrued disproportionately.31 1 Individuals may
provide their personal information to organizations but, by and large,
they are generally unaware about organizational uses of personal
information and have limited roles of involvement in essentially
market-based informational structures.3 12 The notion of inequality is
important because it brings to the fore an analysis of power
307. See Bellia, supra note 111, at 898 (contending a requirement for a wider notion of
dignitary harms that goes beyond material harms relating to identity theft).
308. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY INCONTEXT, supranote 279, at 78. See, e.g., Jeroen van den
Hoven, Privacy and the Varieties of Moral Wrong-Doing in an Information Age, 27 SIGCAS
Comput. Soc. (1997); Jeroen, van den Hoven, Information Technology, Privacy and the
Protection ofPersonalData, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Jeroen

van den Hoven & John Weckert eds., 2008).
309.

NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supranote 279, at 78.

310. For example, a data breach concerning sensitive law enforcement related information
provided by informers can have serious consequences that include threats or loss of life. See,
e.g., Michael Isikoff, Missing: A Laptop of DEA Informants, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 2004,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/53958 (regarding the loss of a laptop containing
informant details relating to investigations conducted by the Drug Enforcement Administration
in the US); MoD Inquiry After Laptop Stolen from Headquarters, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12, 2009,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk news/8409363.stm (regarding the theft of a laptop
from MoD headquarters in the UK); and Previous Cases of Missing Data, BBC NEWS, Dec. 12,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/8409405.stm (regarding other instances of security
failures involving laptops and sensitive UK government information).
311.

NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 279, at 79.

312. See generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001) (regarding a conceptual
overview of the imbalance of power between individuals and corporations).
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relationships which is largely a latent aspect of the information
privacy law literature.313
Informational injustice refers to the importance of personal
information remaining within the contextual sphere within which it
was created and disseminated.3 14 For example, a recent study by
Microsoft about the employment checks conducted by human
resources departments in four different countries found that fortythree percent of US departments had rejected a prospective candidate
based on comments provided by the candidate's 'friends' on
Facebook.315 This 'trial by friends' is thus considered an
informational injustice because it not only takes information from one
context and applies it in another but also because its use of
information in this way ignores the crucial role of context and meekly
accepts that what is being said is representative of an individual.3 16
Finally, encroachment on moral autonomy is linked to the situation
just described as it seeks to protect an individual's capacity to shape
his or hers own life without undue interference and pressure to
conform to some ascribed social norm. 17 Information privacy is
therefore a key issue in society because it allows space for individuals
to generate and fix their identity within a wider social sphere.
The relational and harm elements of a greater contextual
approach are instructive because it highlights some fundamental
limits of information privacy law. Information privacy should not just
relate to problems regarding the governance of a management
process. 1 Instead, information privacy should focus on problems that
are inherently related to social relationships and their management.319
Accordingly, within the context of data breaches and how information
privacy law responds to such issues, this article contends that a
313. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L. J. 2047, 2055 (2001)
(regarding the unacknowledged role of power in privacy law).
314.

NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 279, at 80.

315. See Posting of Daniel Solove to Concurring Opinions Blog, Googling Employees:
Why
Your
Online
Reputation
Matters,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/03/googling-employees-why-your-onlinereputation-matters.html (Mar. 15, 2010, 8:15) (last visited Sept. 10, 2010) (outlining the details
of the study).
316. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 312, at 1421 (regarding the dangers of digital dossiers as
how bureaucracies relate database information to an accurate and entire view of individuals).
317.

NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT, supra note 279, at 80.

318.

See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES,

AND PUBLIC POLICY 230 (The University of North Carolina Press 1995) ("privacy is becoming
less an attribute of individuals and records and more an attribute of social relationships and
information systems or communication systems").
319.

BENNETT & RAAB, GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY, supra note 20, at 25.
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contextual approach is required and a greater focus on privacy rather
than information is needed. Contextualization thus recognizes the
wider relational and harm issues that can arise through a context
dependent analysis. Data breach concerns are not fixated to specific
types of personal information.320 Information privacy problems do not
simply involve providers, collectors and users of personal
information. Regulatory and legislative remedies do not merely entail
simplistic solutions of redress in information management processes.
However, the problem with contextualization is that it requires much
greater legislative, regulatory, and judicial input than information
privacy law currently allow. This point is addressed in the final subsection of this article that explores a different view of the important
role that data breach notification could have within the regulatory
guise of protecting critical information infrastructures.
C. From Data Breach Notification to the Protectionof Critical
InformationInfrastructures
As highlighted throughout this article, data breach notification
laws are intended to fix the specific problem of identity theft threats
arising from data breaches involving personal information through the
mandatory notification of breaches to individuals. The laws also have
an auxiliary aim of producing socially optimal side effects through the
enhancement of corporate information security practices. Previous
sections of this article have highlighted the limits of data breach
notification law in sectoral regimes and data breach notification
schemes implemented within comprehensive information privacy
legal frameworks. Despite the issues highlighted in this article, it must
be noted that data breach notification laws appear to have been a
resounding success.32 They have unearthed a previously hidden
social problem that has the capacity to negatively affect millions of
people's lives. Information privacy laws, as applied in both sectoral
and comprehensive frameworks, are seriously lacking with regard to
the imposition of legal obligations entailing the adequate protection of
personal information. Accordingly, data breach notification laws have
potential value and possibly much to offer. In concluding this article,
the author asserts that the real problem with data breach notification is

320. See, e.g., ST. AMANT, supra note 81, at 523 (highlighting that the revelation of
personal health information can be as detrimental to an individual as financial information).
321. See, e.g., Winn, supra note 76, at 1133 (noting the "tidal wave" of notifications thus
making the "problem of inadequate information security . . . visible" while detailing potential
problems with data breach notification law).
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that the concept is too narrow; it has a limited notion of harm and it is
purposively constrained by an overly context independent approach to
the type of information regulated.
Data breach notification law inherits the same concerns of
information privacy law because it predominantly regards information
management rather than the preservation, protection, and resolution of
social relationships regarding disputes over personal information.
Moreover, within data breach notification laws themselves, there is a
large degree of blame attached to the breached organization within the
limits of a proscribed accountability framework. The breached
organization is deemed to be at fault and, as a result, needs to provide
notification of its failings. Notification is consequently heavily
influenced by the concept of reputational sanction.32 2 However, not
all organizations are to blame extensively particularly in situations
involving sophisticated hackers.323 Some data breaches, such as the
ChoicePoint incident 324 highlighted above, are based on situations
involving the provision of inadequate security measures, but it should
be recognized that some data breaches involving hacking attacks are
ground-breaking in their levels of sophistication.325
Data breach notification laws attempt to resolve the complex
problem of adequate corporate information security measures in a
rudimentary way by mandatory notification. However, this remedy
does not directly address the underlying issues of ineffective
corporate security or indeed whether notification to individuals is an
effective remedy.326 Mandatory notification as a remedy simply
cannot sufficiently account for the contextual realities of data

322. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86, at 917. (stating that a significant focus of data
breach notification law has been "to impose a reputational sanction on breached entities).
323. See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 76, at 10 (regarding the complexities of intrusion
detection in relation to phishing attacks); Kris Erikson & Philip N. Howard, The Information
Vulnerability Landscape. Compromising Positions: Organizationaland Hacker Responsibility
for Exposed Digital Records, in HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY, LAW, AND THE
CORPORATION 46 (Andrea M. Matwyshyn ed., 2009) (reviewing 813 publicly reported security
breach incidents between 1980 and 2007 and confirming that a small percentage of incidents
involve organizations that are "unwilling and unwitting victims of a malicious hacker").
324. See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, CHOICEPOINT (2008), available
at http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/
325. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Google Hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details
Show, WIRED, Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-aurora
(regarding details of a recent Chinese hacking attack perpetrated on Google, Adobe and other
leading US companies that was "unprecedented tactics that combined encryption, stealth
programming and an unknown hole in Internet Explorer").
326. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86, at 947 ("Notification letters supply only
incomplete, discontinuous, and non-comparative information about data security.").
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breaches that regard complex security, social and legal concerns. As
highlighted above, a certain type of personal information breached in
one incident may have a different type of harm to the same
information released in another data breach.32 7 The issue of data
breach notification is therefore inherently contextual and requires
comprehensive case by case analysis regarding the identification of
potential harms and the application of potential remedies. However,
this in turn requires much greater regulatory oversight than that which
is currently envisaged in either sectoral or comprehensive legal
frameworks because data breach notification is primarily directed
towards the mitigation of identity theft. Data breach notification law
attempts to provide instant consumer redress, but in doing so, it
misses the potentially important role that the law could have
regarding the wider implications of adequate protections of personal
information within the fortification of critical information
infrastructures. 328 Data breach notification should be viewed in a
comprehensively different perspective that regards different levels of
social activity and a re-evaluation of the law's role. Figure 3 below
provides a diagrammatical representation.

327. See discussion supraPart I.B.
328. See, e.g., Picanso, supra note 84, at 358 (linking network attacks on personal data to
critical information infrastructures).
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Fig. 3 - The role of data breach notification in light of critical
information infrastructure protection

In Figure 3, three levels of social activity are adduced: micro,
meso, and macro.3 29 The micro level refers to the arena of human
agency in which hackers attack organizational databases of personal
information, employees lose laptops, and organizational employees
notify individuals who take action to protect themselves. These are
the base-level actions that generate issues and concerns regarding
breaches of personal information. The meso level is the middle
ground,330 the decision making arena in which corporate decisions
regarding information security are made. These decisions are crucial
regarding the advent of data breaches as they involve declarations of
intent regarding the implementation of adequate protections involving
personal information. The possibility that a data breach could arise is
heavily influenced by the decisions made in the meso level. For
329.
See also ANDREA M. MATWYSHYN, HARBORING DATA: INFORMATION SECURITY,
LAW, AND THE CORPORATION 3-13 (STANFORD LAW BOOKS 2009) (regarding a different

perspective of the social macro, meso and micro levels entailing corporate information security).
330.
See, e.g., D.W. PARSONS, PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS (EDWARD ELGAR 1995) ("Meso analysis is a middle-range or

bridging level of analysis which is focused on the linkage between the definition of problems,
the setting of agendas and the decision-making and implementation processes.").
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example, if an organization decides to implement adequate security
measures and policies, then it is less likely that a breach will occur
and vice versa. The decision arena of a smaller number of persons can
consequently have a major impact on a much wider number of
individuals at the micro level. Finally, the macro level regards the
ground of structures and super-structures. In this case, it is the
construct of critical information infrastructures, the underlying
information and communication systems upon which both
organizations and individuals are now so dependent. 33 1 Again, those
decisions made in the meso level have the capacity to impact upon the
macro level as vulnerabilities arising from corporate actions can
traverse both upwardly and downwardly through different levels. For
example, a major data breach involving security failures in one
infrastructure can have an impact on many other infrastructures
including the irreparable damage of consumer trust.332
The actions and decisions of different levels can impact upon the
structures within which both human and organizational actors reside.
Data breaches are consequently linked to corporate information
security management procedures which in turn reinforce or reduce
protections related to critical information infrastructures.
Accordingly, data breaches are a reflection of corporate information
security inadequacies, and the latter become weaknesses that need to
be addressed in critical information infrastructures. A simple
corporate decision to use an outdated type of encryption protocol on
its wireless communication system can therefore lead to mass
notification to millions of individuals and major upheaval in the
banking sector simply because a team of sophisticated identity theft
331. Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Critical Information Infrastructure: Vulnerabilities, Threats
and Responses, 3 DISARMAMENT FORUM 3 (2007) (outlining the reasons behind critical
information infrastructure protection and highlighting that these infrastructures are critical
because "their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the national
security and the economic and social welfare of a state"); Andrew Rathmell, Protecting Critical
Information Infrastructures, 20 COMP. & SEC. 44 (2001) (regarding the implications of the
"information revolution" for the protection of state infrastructures); See Eugene Nickolov,
CriticalInformation Infrastructure Protection:Analysis, Evaluation and Expectations, 17 INFO.
& SEC. 105 (2005) (highlighting the dependency of modem societies on the availability and
reliability of technological infrastructures).
332. See, e.g., Schwartz & Janger,Notiicationof DataSecurity Breaches, supra note 86,
at 928 (referring to the data security externality "where a data security breach at one company
may cause harm at another company in a way that is untraceable or for which there is no legal
recourse"). See also Philip E. Auerswald, et al., Where Private Efficiency Meet Public
Vunerability: The Critical Infrastructure Challenge, in SEEDS OF DISASTER, ROOTS OF
RESPONSE: How PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY

8 (Philip E.

Auerswald ed., 2006) (highlighting that no corporation is an island and the ripple effect of
security breaches across economic sectors).
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criminals gained unauthorized access to personal information held by
the retailer.33 3
The introduction of contextualization highlights that data breach
notification is only one complex system within an enmeshed
environment of many complex systems that interact and impact upon
each other. The primary focus on the single issue of identity theft
partially recognizes some of these complexities, but it does not
attempt to represent them in sufficient complexity or depth. Some
authors have made the link between data breach notification and the
onset of a newly developing legal field, information security law.334
Equally, a link between corporate information security measures and
the protection of critical information infrastructures has also been
made. 33 ' Despite the fact that these links have been recognized, data
breach notification laws have continued to have a specific and limited
remit.
This article contends that data breach notification law needs to
be considered contextually as part of a much wider problem that goes
beyond the issue of identity theft mitigation. Moreover, the body of
laws should not be viewed as a 'be all and end all' solution to
problems relating to the inadequate protection of personal information
by corporations. Data breach notification laws are extremely useful at
highlighting problems but that does not mean they necessarily have
the regulatory tools to remedy the problems that they uncover.
Instead, it is more likely that the laws provide a transitory passage
that attempts to take regulation from the identification of a significant
problem (e.g. inadequate information security of personal information
that requires notification) eventually to a potential solution (e.g. the
implementation of effective security measures and competent
333. See, e.g., MATWYSHYN, supra note 329, at 3 (outlining the simplicity of the initial
attack perpetrated on TJX Maxx that was easily avoidable); Kim Zetter, TJX Hacker Charged
With
Heartland,
Hannaford
Breaches,
WIRED,
Aug.
17,
2009,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/tjx-hacker-charged-with-heartland/
(regarding
further sophisticated attacks in the TJX incident which the attackers were able to penetrate most
levels of data storage and the legal implications that flowed from the attacks).
334. See generally Smedinghoff, supra note 100; BH Nearon, et al., Life After SarbannesOxley: The Merger of Information Security and Accountability, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 379 (2005);
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a DigitalAge, 88
TEx. L. REV. 669 (2010); Andrea M Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy,
CorporateInformation Security and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129 (2005);
Winn, supra note 76.
335.
See generally MATWYSHYN, supra note 329; PHILIP E. AUERSWALD, SEEDS OF
DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: How PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY

(Cambridge University Press. 2006); Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Developing U.S. Legal
Standardfor Cybersecurity,4 SED. C. J. 109 (2003).
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monitoring). Notification is therefore only one element of the issue
and should not be deemed as the issue in itself.
Schwartz and Janger emphasized this problem in considerable
depth in their influential article on regulatory structures for data
breach notification.3 3 6 They examined three regulatory models
currently in operation and suggested a fourth model, the Co-ordinated
Response Architecture (CRA) as a hybrid of the strengths and
weaknesses of existing regimes.3 3 7 The CRA has a system of two-tier
disclosure.3 18 The first tier requires the breached organization to
notify the CRA which then determines whether customer notification
is required based on the likelihood of information misuse.339 Unlike
current data breach notification laws, information misuse is to be
construed broadly and does not simply relate to identity theft risks. If
notification is required, the CRA will coordinate the sharing of
information about a data breach, oversee the organization's
investigation and response and monitor notification decisions.3 4 0 The
emphasis of the CRA model is mitigation response and notification
encouragement that seeks organizational cooperation without losing
the threat of reputational sanction. 34 1 The mitigation response element
is clearly crucial and the authors recognize that notification has a
wider role to play within social, technical, and legal structures.
The protection of individuals at the micro level of society is
clearly important, but the protection of the macro information
infrastructures that facilitate societal interactions and transactions is
equally important. An authority such as the CRA, designed for the
purpose of ensuring critical information infrastructure protection,
would undoubtedly engender a greater regulatory focus. But that
emphasis can be readily justified when viewed through the lens of
consumer and infrastructure protection via the encouragement and
enforcement of adequate information security measures. Data breach
notification laws are important, but that importance goes beyond the
specified remit of identity theft and goes to the heart of informationbased societies. It involves the preservation of information pathways
founded on human relations and maintained through information
336. See generally Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86.
337. See id. at 959-69.
338. See also Burdon, et al., Encryption Safe Harbours,supranote 72; Schwartz & Janger,
supra note 86, at 960 (advocating for a two-tier system of notification in relation to encryption
safe harbors).
339. Schwartz & Janger, supra note 86, at 960.
340. Id. at 962-63, 65.
341. Id. at 959-69.
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infrastructures. Data breach notification provides gives a glimpse of
these wider issues that unfortunately get subsumed by contested
arguments relating to consumer protection and corporate compliance
cost minimization. A revision of data breach notification, and indeed
information privacy, is required that moves beyond the limited
application of individual rights to the societal interests everyone has
regarding the protection of personal information and the modes of
information exchange. However, a macro perspective reveals
complex structures that are difficult to regulate but nonetheless still
require governance. The forms of legal governance are not yet
adequately defined, and the issues raised by data breach notification
laws indicate that there is still much distance to travel.
VI. CONCLUSION

This article contends that both information privacy and data
breach notification laws appear to have a similar purpose that
involves the protection of personal information. However, both laws
have fundamental differences between them and shared weaknesses
within them. In some ways, data breach notification is too
conceptually complex as it is multifaceted and expansive in its
foundation from the California law. This expansiveness is confined by
a focus on compliance cost mitigation.
Alternatively, information privacy suffers from the opposite
effect. The concept is too limited in focus because it attempts to
regulate the process of personal information exchange and that
provides a constraint on what is a privacy issue. Data breach
notification in both sectoral and comprehensive approaches may
therefore be a potentially expansive bolt-on which is implemented by
a narrow focused law in an attempt to ascribe limited rights pertaining
to an individual's involvement in the collection, storage and use of
their personal information. The introduction of contextualization
highlights the fact that both laws are predicated on certainty in order
to reduce the ambiguous nature of privacy. Nonetheless, both laws
need to include the social context of human relationships that
underpin personal information exchange processes.
The application of contextualization promotes a revision of both
data breach notifications and information privacy laws that move
beyond notions of individual rights related to controls over personal
information to societal protections of essential information
infrastructures. To do so will require new modes of regulation and the
development of new types of law. These are complex issues
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especially if one considers that the process of personal information
exchange is innately human and subject to the application of different
contexts. Data breach notification law begins to reveal these
complexities, and in doing so highlights the limits of current
information privacy laws. However, data breach notification is not a
'be all and end all' solution in itself but merely provides a signpost
for a journey to be undertaken. Exactly how that journey will manifest
remains to be seen, but it is seemingly clear that the first steps have
been taken. It is likely that different directions will be charted based
on the application of sectoral and comprehensive regimes, but this
article has attempted to show that future journeys should be mindful
of the requirement for contextualization given the inherent tensions
and weaknesses of both data breach notification and information
privacy laws.
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